Establishing the Software-Defined Networking Based Defensive System in Clouds by Xing, Tianyi (Author) et al.
Establishing the Software-Defined Networking Based Defensive System in Clouds
by
Tianyi Xing
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirement for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved October 2014 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Dijiang Huang, Chair
Guoliang Xue
Arunabha Sen
Deepankar Medhi
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
December 2014
ABSTRACT
Cloud computing is regarded as one of the most revolutionary technologies in the
past decades. It provides scalable, flexible and secure resource provisioning services,
which is also the reason why users prefer to migrate their locally processing work-
loads onto remote clouds. Besides commercial cloud system (i.e., Amazon EC2[15]),
ProtoGENI [9] and PlanetLab [68] have further improved the current Internet-based
resource provisioning system by allowing end users to construct a virtual network-
ing environment. By archiving the similar goal but with more flexible and efficient
performance, I present the design and implementation of MobiCloud [83] that is a
geo-distributed mobile cloud computing platform, and G-PLaNE [85] that focuses on
how to construct the virtual networking environment upon the self-designed resource
provisioning system consisting of multiple geo-distributed clusters. Furthermore, I
conduct a comprehensive study to layout existing Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC)
service models and corresponding representative related work in [41]. A new user-
centric mobile cloud computing service model is proposed to advance the existing
mobile cloud computing research.
After building the MobiCloud, G-PLaNE and studying the MCC model, I have
been using Software Defined Networking (SDN) approaches to enhance the system
security in the cloud virtual networking environment. I present an OpenFlow based
IPS solution called SDNIPS [86] that includes a new IPS architecture based on Open
vSwitch (OVS) in the cloud software-based networking environment. It is enabled
with elasticity service provisioning and Network Reconfiguration (NR) features based
on POX controller. Finally, SDNIPS demonstrates the feasibility and shows more
efficiency than traditional approaches through a thorough evaluation.
At last, I propose an OpenFlow-based defensive module composition framework
called CloudArmour that is able to perform query, aggregation, analysis, and con-
i
trol function over distributed OpenFlow-enabled devices. I propose several modules
and use the DDoS attack as an example to illustrate how to composite the compre-
hensive defensive solution based on CloudArmour framework. I introduce total 20
Python-based CloudArmour APIs. Finally, evaluation results prove the feasibility
and efficiency of CloudArmour framework.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has grown rapidly in recent few years due to the increasing net-
work bandwidth, mature virtualization techniques, and emerging cloud based business
demands. Besides the traditional service models of cloud computing, i.e., IaaS, PaaS
and SaaS, new models keep coming out to provide new types of services, e.g., StaaS
(Storage as a Service), DaaS (Desktop as a Service), NaaS (Network as a Service),
etc. After the neonatal stage of cloud computing, especially within the recent few
years, cloud computing has shifted its focus from fixed users oriented to dynamic mo-
bile users oriented, from local to global, from centralized to distributed architecture.
Among all issues related to clouds, mobile cloud computing platform, user centric
mobile cloud service model, and virtual networking security have been regarded as
most critical concerns as well as my research focus.
1.1 Mobile Cloud Computing System
Today, the Internet web service is the major way that we access information from
fixed or mobile terminals. Information is stored on Internet clouds, where comput-
ing, communication, and storage services are common services provided for Internet
users. In a non-distant future, many of our queries will be beyond current Internet
scope and will be about the people, the physical environments that surround us, and
virtual environments that we will be involved. With the Internet environment getting
improved, mobile phones will overtake PCs as the most common web access entities
worldwide by 2014 as predicted by Gartner [53]. Current mobile devices have many
advanced features such as mobility, communication and sensing capabilities, and can
1
serve as the personal information gateway for mobile users. However, when running
complex data mining and storing operations, the computation, energy, and storage
limitations of mobile devices demand an integrated solution relying on cloud-based
computation and storage support. As a result, a new research field, called Mobile
Cloud Computing (MCC), is emerging to meet the increasing demand and address
the issues.
The trend of the MCC system is not just aiming to provide services for users
in some certain areas, but is especially looking forward to establishing connections
among mobile users all over the world. Due to the mobility of MCC users, a geograph-
ically distributed cloud system is a natural choice that allows users to connect to the
cloud resource that is geographically “close” to their mobile devices, which usually
means less communication delay compared to the centralized approach. Here, a ge-
ographically distributed MCC system refers to an infrastructure combining multiple
cloud clusters (with dedicated computing, storage, and communication resources) lo-
cated at different locations. Unlike the centralized service provisioning data centers,
in geographically distributed data centers, users’ requests will be responded by the
closest and least loaded data centers, that guarantees better user experience. Many
cloud service providers, like Google and Amazon, place their data centers all over the
world to provide rapid resource and service access for end users.
1.2 Mobile Cloud Computing Service Model
One the mobile cloud computing platform is physically established, another signif-
icant research topic goes to the logic part, i.e., service model. In MCC, a mobile entity
can be considered as either a physical mobile device or a mobile computing/storage
software agent within a virtualized cloud resource provisioning system. In the lat-
ter view of the cloud system, a software agent’s main functionality is the mobility
2
associated with the software codes. In other words, mobile cloud applications may
migrate or compose software codes in the distributed MCC resource-provisioning envi-
ronment. Mobile cloud services will account for delay, energy consumption, real-time
entity presence, information caching capabilities, networking and communication con-
nectivity, data protection and sharing requirements, and so on. By achieving these
features, we are able to create a new world composed by both physically networked
systems and virtualized entities that are mapped to the physical systems preserving
and in some cases extending their functions and capabilities.
MCC distinguishes its research focuses on a tight interaction between, and con-
struction and integration of, the Cyber Physical System (CPS) and Cyber Virtual
System (CVS), in which the CPS is immensely composed by computational and
physical smart and mobile entities, and the CVS is mainly formed by cloud-based
virtualized resource and services. Recent developments of Augmented Reality (AR)
[13, 72, 17, 22] have demonstrated some of the application capabilities of MCC.
1.3 Cloud Network Security Issues
Cloud computing technologies have been widely adopted today due to its resource
provisioning capabilities, such as scalability, high availability, efficiency, and so on.
However, security is one of the critical issues that have not been fully addressed
[14]. Attackers may compromise vulnerable virtual machines (VMs) to form botnets,
and then deploy distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks or send spams, which
have become a major security concern of using cloud services. Several critical cloud
network security issues are highlighted as below:
1. Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing. IaaS providers offer
their customers the illusion of unlimited compute, network, and storage capacity. By
abusing the relative anonymity behind these registration and usage models, spam-
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mers, malicious code authors, and other criminals have been able to conduct their
activities with relative impunity. PaaS providers have traditionally suffered most
from this type of attacks; however, recent evidence shows that hackers have begun to
target IaaS vendors as well [46]. Future areas of concern include password and key
cracking, launching dynamic attack points, hosting malicious data, botnet command
and control, etc.
2. Malicious Insiders. The threat of a malicious insider is well-known to most
organizations. This threat is amplified for consumers of cloud services by the con-
vergence of IT services and customers under a single management domain, combined
with a general lack of transparency into provider process and procedure. In traditional
computer networking systems, security protection is usually deployed at the edge of
the system, for example, the firewall system. However, an attacker can break the
firewall or DMZ and get access into the internal network, these attack consequences
can be very servere. Since all resources in the same domain is trusted among each
other by default, insider attacks can cause more damage than outsider attacks.
3. Data Integrate. Storage is one of the most important and common scenarios
in clouds. Therefore, compromising stored data, e.g., deletion or alteration of records
without a backup of the original content, becomes another critical security issue in
clouds. The authentication and authorization of the data must securely guarantee
that unauthorized or unauthenticated parties must be prevented from gaining access
to privacy data. The threat of data compromise increases in the cloud, due to the
number of and interactions between risks and challenges which are either unique to
cloud, or more dangerous because of the architectural or operational characteristics
of the cloud environment.
4. Virtualization Hijacking. One of the significant characteristics of the cloud
computing is the virutalization, which enables better resources utilization and fine
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grained resource isolation. IaaS vendors provide their services by sharing the physi-
cal infrastructure in a scalable fashion. However, the underlying components building
up the infrastructure (e.g., CPU, GPU, etc.) were not dedicated designed to deliver
strong isolation capability in a multi-tenant environment. To address this issues, hy-
pervisor is designed and introduced to fill the gap between the physical infrastructure
and guest operating system. However, the existing hypervisor is not flawless and can
still be compromised in that it enables users to gain access to inappropriate level of
control to guest OS. A defense in depth strategy is recommended, and should include
compute, storage, and network security enforcement and monitoring. Strong com-
partmentalization should be also employed to guarantee that individual customers
do not impact the operations of other tenants running on the same cloud service
provider. Customers should not have access to any other tenant’s actual or residual
data, network traffic, etc.
1.4 Outline
My research interests mainly involve the cloud infrastructure design and imple-
mentation, cloud service design and implementation, software defined network, cloud
network security, etc. The outline of this dissertation is arranged as follows: Chapter
2 discusses the related work for all related research areas, and a brief summary of
them. Chapter 3 mainly discusses the research challenges and expected objective
for my research. MobiCloud and G-PLaNE system are discussed in chapter 4 and 5
respectively. Chapter 6 introduces a new MCC model and corresponding exemplar
architecture. Chapter 7 discusses a SDN-enabled IPS system in cloud environment.
A SDN-enabled modular composition framework called CloudArmour is discussed in
chapter 8. Finally, chapter 9 concludes this dissertation and discusses the future
work.
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Chapter 2
STATE OF THE ART
2.1 Cloud System & Platform
Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) [10], is a project exploring
the future global networking infrastructure where different types of resource provision-
ing platforms are residing. GENI projects can be divided into backbone networks,
programmable hosts, wireless testbeds and specialized aggregates. Different GENI
platforms, e.g., PlanetLab [68], ProtoGENI [9], and OpenFlow Networks [54], have
different concentration in terms of provisioning resources, network architecture, pro-
grammable networks, etc. For example, ProtoGENI has integrated a large group of
Table 2.1: Comparison table of GENI Projects
Project Major Sensing Programmable Extension
Resource Capability Networks Simplicity
PlanetLab Fedora VM No No Difficult
ProtoGENI (Emu-
lab)
PC and VM USRP Yes Difficult
OpenFlow Net-
works
OF Switch No Yes DD
GENICloud (open-
cirrus)
Physical node No No NA
Seattle Experimenter Software No No Easy
ORBIT Dedicated node No Yes NA
DOME Linux VM No No NA
DETER (Emulab) PC No Yes NA
Kansei Sensing node Yes No NA
ViSE Debian VM Yes Yes NA
GpENI Fedora VM No Yes DD
MobiCloud Windows, Linux VMs Yes Yes CaaS
DD: Dedicated Device, NA: Not Allowed
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resources available from the world to provide resources with network programmability
and sensing features. Seattle [26] has an efficient design that can easily make spare
nodes join their available resource pool to be further utilized to provide python based
experiments. All GENI related projects [68, 9, 54, 25, 26, 69, 74, 21, 16, 43, 76] and
our proposed MobiCloud are summarized in Table 2.1.
2.2 Mobile Cloud System and Services
Table 2.2: Summary of MCC Services and Applications
MCC Services and Applications Service Models
MCC Service Types Representative Approaches MaaSC MaaSP MaaSB
Mobile Cloud Computation CloneCloud [28] X
MAUI [32] X
ThinkAir [49] X
Mobile Cloud Storage Dropbox, Box, iCloud, GoogleDrive
and Skydrive [31]
X
WhereStore [77] X
STACEE [60] X X
Security and Privacy CloudAV [63] X
Secure Web Referral Services for Mo-
bile Cloud Computing [50]
X
Zscaler [12] X
Google Wallet [37] X
Context Awareness An Integrated Cloud-based Framework
for Mobile Phone Sensing [34]
X X
I summarize existing MCC services and applications in Table 2.2. I defined 3
service models, Mobile as a Service Consumer (MaaSC), Mobile as a Service Provider
(MaaSP), Mobile as a Service Broker (MaaSB), based on the role of mobile devices
in the MCC environment. The service models are classified based on the role of the
mobile device, such as service consumer, service provider, and service broker. More
detail on the service model will be discusses in chapter 6. I also discuss corresponding
7
representative projects. Each service or application can be categorized into one or
multiple service models. MaaSC is the most common MCC service model because
most of existing mobile devices are still restricted by their computation and energy
capacities. As an example, clonecloud [28] provides the computation task offloading
service for mobile devices. In this case, the mobile device is the service consumer
since it only gets benefit from the service provided by cloud rather than providing
services for other users.
2.2.1 Mobile Cloud Computation
Computation task offloading is a demanding feature for mobile devices relying
on Internet clouds to perform resources-intensive computation tasks. Partitioning
computation tasks and allocating them between mobile devices and clouds can be very
inefficient during the application runtime considering various performance metrics
such as energy consumption, CPU power, network delay, etc. How to efficiently and
intelligently offload the computation tasks onto the cloud is one of the main research
issues of MCC. CloneCloud [28] and MAUI [32] are two pioneer work in this area.
They both can automatically offload computing tasks to the cloud.
CloneCloud serves as an application partitioner as well as an execution runtime
environment that allows unmodified mobile applications seamlessly offloading parts
of the executions from mobile devices onto a cloud server. The offloading decision is
made by optimizing execution time and energy usage for mobile devices. Contrast
to CloneCloud, MAUI allows modifying offloading applications at the coding level
to maximize the energy saving of mobile devices. Thinkair [49] demands dedicated
virtual machines (VMs) in clouds as part of a complete smartphone system, and
removes the restrictions on applications/inputs/environmental conditions by using
an online method-level offloading.
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2.2.2 Mobile Cloud Storage
Storage capacity is another constraint of mobile devices. There are many exist-
ing storage services for mobile devices, e.g., Dropbox, Box, iCloud, Google Drive,
and Skydrive [31]. Besides manually uploading the files or data onto the cloud, one
desired feature of mobile cloud storage services is the automatic synchronization be-
tween mobile devices and the cloud. Multimedia data generated by mobile devices
demands a stable and high available storage solution. This is the reason that many
smartphone operating systems natively implant the multimedia data synchronization
feature, e.g., iCloud for iOS, Skydrive for Window Phone, Google Drive for Android,
etc. Moreover, mobile users’ behavior data such as location traces, browsing history,
personal contacts, preference settings need to be kept in a reliable and protected stor-
age space. Most existing commercial cloud storage solutions are built on a centralized
data center, which is appropriate for Internet Clouds.
Storage mobility has been gradually becomes a recent research focus. Where-
Store [77] is a location-based data storage solution for smartphones. It uses filtered
replication (a filter expressing the set of data items that are likely to be accessed in
the near future) along with each device’s location history to distribute data items
between smartphones and the cloud. STACEE [60] proposes a peer-to-peer cloud
storage where mobile phones, tablets, set-top-boxes, modems and networked storage
devices can all contribute as storage within these storage clouds. It provides a peer-
to-peer (P2P) cloud storage solution and addresses the storage issue for mobile users
as a QoS-aware scheduling problem.
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2.2.3 Security and Privacy
Security related services aim to provide data security protections through the
cloud. Security of mobile devices can be enhanced under the help of cloud security
mechanism including cloud-based secure proxy, remote anti-virus, remote attestation,
etc.
CloudAV [63] advocates such a cloud-based security model for malware detection
for end hosts by providing antivirus as an in-cloud security service. Secure web referral
services [50] enable the antivirus and anti-phishing services through the cloud. The
referral services depend on a secure search engine to validate URLs accessed by a
mobile device to prevent mobile users from accessing phishing websites.
Zscaler [12] is one of the most well-known commercial cloud-based security com-
pany that provides policy-based, secure internet access for mobile devices. It provides
a comprehensive cloud-based security solution including three main components: ZEN
(proxy), CA (central authority), and Nanologs server (log server). Various cloud-
based security services are built based on these components. For example, the ByteS-
can service enables each ZEN to scan every byte of the web request, content, responses
and all related data to block malicious actions and data such as viruses, cross site
scripting (XSS), botnets, etc.; The PageRisk service relies on the ZEN to computes a
PageRisk index for every page loaded and enables the administrator to control con-
tent served to their users based on an acceptable risk evaluation; the NanoLog service
enables administrators to access any transaction log in realtime.
An increasing number of security features can be enabled in cloud, in which a
reliable and secure connection between a mobile device and the cloud is the main
challenge for this type of solutions. Google Wallet [37] is developed on a cloud-mobile
dual trust root model, where the cloud is in charge of the application level security
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such as credit card transactions and user credential management, and the Google
Wallet mobile device is protected by strong trust computing elements on the board
to prevent malicious attacks on the mobile devices.
2.2.4 MCC Context Awareness
Nowadays, a smart mobile device usually serves as an information gateway for
mobile users involving various personalized activities such as checking emails, making
an appointment, surfing the web, locating some interested spots, analyzing personal
behavior data based on data mining and machine learning, etc. For example, in
[34], each mobile device has a dedicated Mobile Cloud Engine (MCE) including three
modules: decision module, publish subscribe module, and context awareness module.
The decision module handles and regulates the transactions among the different parts
of the MCE. The publish subscribe module is responsible for establishing the data flow
between the mobile application and the MCE. Finally, the context awareness module
provides context information to the application. The state-of-the-art solutions lack a
unified approach suitable to support diverse applications, while reducing the energy
consumption and providing intelligent assistance to mobile users.
2.3 Traditional Security Solutions for DDoS attack
Among all malicious behaviors, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is one of the
most critical issues in cloud virtual networking environment since the DDoS attack is
hard to defend once the internal resources are controlled by attackers. Thus, in my
research work, DDoS has been used to demonstrate the security defensive solution.
According to the definition from WWW Security FAQ [75] on Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks: “A DDoS attack uses many computers to launch a coordi-
nated DoS attack against one or more targets. Using client/server technology, the
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perpetrator is able to multiply the effectiveness of the DoS significantly by harnessing
the resources of multiple unwitting accomplice computers, which serve as attack plat-
form”. The countermeasure of DDoS includes identification, trace, and prevention
action.
In [33], author classified the solution of DDoS attack into different ways, such as
filtering, disabling unused services, changing IP address, load balancing, honeypots,
etc. Data-mining technology is normally applied in DDoS attack detection. In [78],
authors used an incremental mining approach to detect large-scale attacks for network
intrusion detection system. This work is distinguished because traffic information is
obtained in real time and the analysis is not done by static data. Another work [88]
presented a multiple layers game-theoretic framework for DDoS attack and defense
evaluation. An innovative point in this work is the strategic thinking of attacker’s
perspective benefit the defense decision maker in this interaction between attacks
and defenses. However, two works above are not suitable for deploying dynamic
network threats countermeasure and has no real time security solution for real time
attacks. In [89], authors proposed a dynamic resource allocation strategy to counter
DDoS attacks against individual cloud customers. When a DDoS attack occurs, they
employ the idle resources of the cloud to clone sufficient intrusion prevention servers
for the victim in order to quickly filter out attack packets and guarantee the quality
of the service for benign users simultaneously. However, this paper focused on how
to allocated idle resource for IPS but did not discuss how the IPS prevent the DDoS
attack.
Since DDoS attack is different from other types of attacks in terms of the great
number of the attack sources, packet marking technique is widely used for IP trace-
back to locate the attack sources. In [36], the authors present a marking mechanisms
for DDoS traceback, which injects a unique mark to each packet for traffic identi-
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fication. As a Probabilistic Packet Marking(PPM) method, it has a potential that
leads attackers to inject marked Packet and spoofed the traffic. [20] is another impor-
tant traceback method by using Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM). The victim
could track the packets from the router which splits the IP address into two seg-
ments. Differing from previous methods, the authors present an independent method
to traceback attacker based on entropy variations in [90]. However, most of these
works did not handle the IP spoofing effectively, and packet modification needs to be
enabled, which introduces more overhead and even vulnerabilities.
2.4 SDN-enabled Cloud Network Solutions
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Figure 2.1: The OpenFlow Architecture.
OpenFlow is a representative standard and protocol implementing SDN concept.
As shown in Fig. 2.1, it introduces a centralized controller and defines standard in-
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terfaces to the controller for installing a packet-forwarding rules in the flow table
that is defined in [64]. The flow table is in the data plane and is able to rapidly
handle incoming packets at line rate. It mainly has fields such as match fields, prior-
ity, counters, instructions, etc. The statistics counter field of the flow table records
statistics of traffic passing through all the OpenFlow devices, such as individual and
aggregate flow statistics, flow table statistics, port statistics, queue statistics, etc. In
the OpenFlow architecture, a controller executes all control tasks of the switches and
is also used for deploying new networking frameworks, such as new routing protocols
or optimized cross-layer packet-switching algorithms. When a packet arrives at an
OpenFlow switch (OFS) or Open vSwitch (OVS), the switch processes the packet in
the following three steps:
1. It checks the header fields of an incoming packet and tries to match any entry in
the local flow table. If there is no matching entry in the flow table, the packet
is encapsulated and is sent to the controller for further processing. There can
be multiple flow control rules. It follows a best matching procedure to pick the
best rule, e.g., the one with the highest priority.
2. It then updates the byte and packet counting information associated with the
rules to log statistics, which can be used to collect the traffic information to
detect any abnormal traffic.
3. Once a matching rule is decided, the OpenFlow switch takes the action based
on the corresponding flow table entry, e.g., forwarding to a specific port, or
dropping.
OpenFlow switch separates the control plane and data plane by virtualizing the
network control as a network OS layer. The network controller is considered as the
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software engine to deploy the control functions that can be implemented through
automatic control algorithms. With these features, dynamic network reconfiguration
can be implemented in the cloud virtual networking environment. There are several
OFS controllers available following the OpenFlow standard, such as NOX/POX [38].
Both OVS and OFS are OpenFlow protocol enabled switches. For all works men-
tioned in this report, I choose to use OVS to represent all the OpenFlow switches
implemented as a software switch in the cloud environment, where OVS is usually
implemented in the privilege domain of a cloud server, e.g., Domain 0 of XenServer
[30] and the host domain of KVM [3]; while the OFS represents physical OpenFlow
switches.
OpenFlow switch, as a programming network device with high flexibility and
scalability, has been largely deployed to enable new services or enhance performance
especially for network scenarios [48, 45, 79]. Also, combining the OpenFlow with
other opensource packages creates new opportunities. QuaggaFlow [58] integrates
the Quagga opensource routing suite with OpenFlow to provide a centralized control
over the physical OpenFlow switches and Quagga router in Virtual Machine (VM).
However, very few researchers started using OpenFlow as a way for security purpose,
especially in cloud environment.
2.5 SDN-enabled Security Solutions
SDN has been well researched to establish monitoring system [70] [18] [80] due to
its centralized abstract architecture. These three works all utilize the programmable
fabric of OpenFlow monitor the traffic and detect the malicious behavior. However,
all three aforementioned studies did not specifically consider the SDN-based detection
for DDoS attack and countermeasure for malicious behaviors. OpenSafe[18] is a net-
work monitoring system that allows administrators to easily collect usage statistics
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of networking and detect malicious activities by leveraging programmable network
fabric. It uses OpenFlow technique to enable some manipulations of traffic, such as
selective rules matching and arbitrary flows directing, to achieve its goal. Further-
more, ALARMS is designed as a policy language to articulate paths of switches for
easily network management. OpenNetMon [80] is another network monitoring appli-
cation based on OpenFlow platform and is implemented to monitor per-flow metrics
to deliver fine-grained input for traffic engineering. Benefiting from the OpenFlow
interfaces that enable statistic query from controller, authors proposed an accurate
way to measure per-flow throughput, delay and packet loss metrics. In [70], authors
proposed a new framework to address the detection problem by manipulating net-
work flows to security nodes for investigation. This flow-based detection mechanism
guarantees all necessary traffic packets are inspected by security nodes. However, all
three aforementioned studies did not specifically consider the SDN-based detection
for DDoS attack and did not discuss the countermeasure for malicious activities.
SDN technology is also used to detect specific threat, e.g., DDoS, in cloud system.
In [23], the authors present a flow-based lightweight method for DDoS attack de-
tection. This solution is implemented on NOX/OpenFlow platform to collect traffic
statistic information from flow table by Flow Collector. Important DDoS relevant
features will be extracted from feature extractor module and be sent to classifier
where classification algorithm comes from Self Organizing Maps (SOM)[47] method.
However, this paper does not provide an optimized detection solution for distributed
cloud environment and corresponding countermeasures for the DDoS attack.
Besides detection, proposing SDN-enabled prevention solutions is another key di-
rection for SDN based security research. CONA [27] is a content-oriented networking
architecture build on NetFPGA-OpenFlow platform. In this design, hosts request
contents and agents deliver the requested contents while the hosts can not. Under
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Table 2.3: Security Solutions Comparison Table
Project Cloud Detection Prevention DDoS
CloudWatcher [70]
OpenSafe [18]
OpenNetMon [80]
Avant-Guard [71]
Lightweight DDoS Detection [23]
ORHM [44]
CONA [27]
NICE [29]
SnortFlow [84]
the content-aware supervision, system can perform prevention by: (1) collecting sus-
pect flows information from others agents for analysis, and (2) applying rate limit
to each of relevant agents to slow down the overwhelming malicious traffic. Open-
Flow Random Host Mutation (OFRHM) [44] is another innovative solution by using
Moving Target Defense (MTD) to protect the targets from being attacked though
changing its identity representation. In this research, they add a transparent virtual
IP layer above real IP and make real IP addresses untouchable by unauthorized en-
tities. The system will assign a virtual IP to each host after each mutation interval.
However, this work is a proactive solution and does not work when the attack is
initiated from malicious insiders who are aware of the real IP address of victims.
Finally, besides enhancing the security level by utilizing the SDN technology, en-
hancing the security of the SDN itself is also a hot topic. In [71], authors proposed
AVANTGUARD, a new framework to advance the security and resilience of open-
Flow networks with greater involvement from the data-plane layer. It makes SDN
security applications more scalable and responsive to dynamic network threats. They
introduce actuating triggers that automatically insert flow rules when the network is
under duress. The overhead of the proposed extension over SDN was evaluated to be
minimal. All SDN-based security solution are summarized in Table. 2.3.
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Chapter 3
RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND OBJECTIVES
The research challenges and objectives are classified into the following several
perspectives.
3.1 Mobile Cloud Computing Platform
Several MCC system is described in the chapter 2, however, there are more issues
brought by such emerging architecture.
Resource Management. When some physical machines in the datacenter are
approaching the capacity limit of the system, all devices accessing those machines
will be affected. Without efficient resource management approaches, service providers
have no choice but to purchase additional physical cloud servers to overcome this issue.
To decrease the cost as much as possible, efficient resource management approach that
considers resource scheduling, workload balancing, etc., are needed to handle the crisis
introduced by hardware resource shortages.
Resource Diversity. Virtual machine is the major format of the resource due to
its efficient utilization of hardware resources, although some systems choose to provide
physical nodes. All major guest OSes can be supported in a main stream virtualization
environment, e.g., Xen [66]. However, current service providers pay more attention to
system architecture design but not enough to resources provisioning diversity, which
means users have little choice on resources. The resource diversity includes not only
the type of guest OS, but also different virtual hardware configurations.
Network Programmability and Sensibility. A static and simple network
cannot meet the increasing demand from users nowadays. Network programmabil-
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ity usually separates the control and data path of network device, and provides an
interface of the control path so that the control function can be easily programmed.
Programmable network devices are more flexible in that they make decisions based
on not only predefined rules, but also on dynamically generated policies. Sensibil-
ity provides a bridge connecting cloud resources and the physical world. Sensibility
greatly expands the range of experiments supported in the system.
Extensibility and Scalability. All resource provisioning systems are facing the
extension issue when the number of users is increasing. This issue involves two tracks
on internal and external one. For the internal issue, the system should consider how
to expand the system without changing and affecting the current running system. For
example, add more storage servers. For the external issue, the system should consider
how others can easily join the system family without much effort. For example, how
to make the donated nodes to easily become available resources in system resource
pool.
SLA Guarantee. Since cloud resource provisioning is a neonatal service, the
performance is not as optimal as others imagine. With a growing number of cloud
resource provisioning platforms being developed, how to provide resources within an
acceptable time period is another major concern. Besides responding time, SLA also
refers to system availability. For some geo-distributed research-oriented platforms,
e.g., ProtoGENI, multiple universities or institutions are providing resources collab-
oratively. It always happens that some of the resources are not available due to node
failure or connection failure. Thus, how to enhance the reliability and availability of
all resources is also a critical concern for current MCC platform development.
Inter-Domain Communication. Users probably expect a type of resource such
as virtual machines (VMs) that connect with each other across domains. Furthermore,
in this virtual network resource environment, data and services need to be transferred
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from one to another sometimes, which is highly dependent on inter-domain commu-
nication. How to optimize the inter-domain communication to establish highly con-
nected resources and transfer the service or data to the destination server without
noticed delay is also another challenge for the existing geo-distributed cloud system.
To address challenges and achieve objectives illustrated above, I choose Xen-based
virtualization solution which is an efficient and flexible hypervisor and supports a
wide range of guest OS. For the backend network of the cloud system, I enable the
SDN control in the form of Open vSwitch (OVS) to flexibly control the network
traffic and manage the virtual network. Another major concern is how to improve
the cloud system from centralized architecture into the geo-distributed architecture,
which raises another problem that the interconnection among different clusters should
be guaranteed. After enabling the SDN network management as our backend network
function, I establish the GRE tunnel among all remote site. Thus, the inter-cluster
connection is established in a layer-2 fashion, which VLAN is still supported across
different sites. After the mainframe is built, I can further design the higher layer
resource provisioning and monitoring function.
3.2 Mobile Cloud Computing Service Model
From the service point of view, current mobile cloud computing service providers
and their services customers (i.e., mobile devices) are clearly defined. Most existing
computing models are similar to the traditional “client-server” type of service models.
Serval issues for the existing MCC services are explained and the expected transition
characteristics are also discussed given as below.
Symmetric MCC Service Model: Most current MCC service models are in the
asymmetric fashion. As examples presented in Table 2.2, mobile devices are usually
considered as clients of cloud services. The service (e.g., computing and storage
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services) direction is mainly one directional, i.e., from cloud to mobile devices. With
the increasing capability of mobile devices, mobile devices can also collaboratively
execute the applications tasks. Moreover, the virtualized environment should provide
intelligent feedbacks to physical devices to adjust their behaviors or actions in order to
provide better virtualized services. This virtualization-feedback loop model demands
a symmetric MCC service model, i.e., both mobile devices and the virtualized cloud
are service providers as well as clients.
Personalized Situation Awareness: In the current complicated mobile cloud en-
vironment, data sources could be diverse, e.g., mobile device, environment, or social
network. Sometimes, single data source is not sufficient for supporting MCC ap-
plications in the cloud; moreover, data collected from heterogeneous network might
be unstructured or unclassified. For example, in the physical world, there could be
multiple networking interfaces and services that are available to a user’s device, e.g.,
wireless sensor network, social network, vehicular network, personal & body area
network, etc. cloud should be able to get data from different source network and
then cluster them together to make the data structural and readable in the future.
Thus, more work is expected to construct situation awareness services that can be
personalized according to individual users in the virtual environment.
User-Centric Trust Model: Most current cloud trust model is centralized, i.e., all
mobile entities need to trust the cloud service provider. Storing private data in the
cloud environment is a big hurdle for most of mobile cloud applications. It is desirable
to establish a distributed or decentralized trust management framework within the
virtualized cloud system to address the privacy concerns of mobile users. In the
physical world, the virtualized resource could be hosted in either public or private
clouds that are tailored according to users preference. This requirement demands to
transfer current centralized cloud to into a distributed or decentralized fashion. For
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example, including mobile users’ computing and storage resources into the mobile
cloud infrastructure without requiring (or even allowing) administrative privilege can
significantly reduce the privacy concerns from mobile users.
3.3 Cloud Security Approach Design
Here, I will describe two major design requirements that should be considered to
establish a secure cloud networking environment.
1. Robust Network Architecture Design. Before building the cloud system,
a robust security system design is highly desired. The following criteria should be
followed when designing the cloud network architecture.
• Network isolation should be provided for multiple purposes. For example, data
networks should be separated from the management network because it is not
secure to make users have privilege to access the cloud management network.
Moreover, different networks needs to be separated from each other physically
by using different network devices, e.g., switch, or virtually by deploying the
network virtualization technology, such as VLAN, GRE tunnel, etc.
• The system should allocate sufficient resources based on the usage of system
components. For example, storage network usually should be allocated with
more bandwidth than management network because only control messages are
sent over management network while Gigabit-sized virtual machine images may
be transmitted over the storage network. Besides network resources, host re-
sources should be also considered. For example, the rabbitMQ, i.e., the message
queuing system, should be allocated with better resources due to its higher pro-
cessing workload than other servers, otherwise, it will become the bottleneck of
the whole system.
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• They system should be enabled with High Availability (HA), e.g., redundant
or backup, to avoid the single point (link) failure. The HA can be reflected in
either network or host perspective. It is recommended to enable the HA for the
services that especially can be directly accessed by users.
The challenge of building a robust network architecture is that there can not be
a perfect system design, which means, system architect or administrator can only
design a near perfect system and always have other security solutions to prevent the
system from being impact by any possible malicious behavior.
2. Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IDS/IPS). An intuitive
solution to address the cloud security issues is to deploy an Intrusion Detection and
Prevention System (IDS/IPS), e.g., Snort [5], Suricata [6], etc. Detecting and alert-
ing natures of IDS solutions demand the human-in-the-loop to inspect the generated
security alerts, which cannot respond to attacks in a prompt fashion. Recently, the
Software Defined Networking (SDN) technologies provide a programmable networking
environment, which enable the Intrusion Prevention System to become a key research
area in the cloud automated defensive mechanism. In general, the IPS can be con-
structed based on IDS. For instance, Snort can be configured as inline mode and work
with a common firewall system, e.g., Iptables, to implement the IPS in the cloud net-
working environment [56]. However, there are several issues in the Snort+Iptables
based IPS system, and our presented solutions target at addressing these issues:
• Latency : The IPS detection engine usually uses a buffer to queue incoming
packets for inspection purpose, and a packet will be dropped when the incoming
packets exceeds the buffer’s capacity. This mechanism ensure the IPS for packets
inspection and possible blocking actions on each network packet. IPS usually
consumes more cloud system resources compared to IDS, and it also increases
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the packet delivery delay due to the packets inspection procedure.
• Resource Consumption: Enabling new services in the system will consume more
resources and downgrade the system performance. For the service that is highly
interactive with all the network traffic generated in the cloud virtual network-
ing system, resources utilization becomes very critical since the security services
availability depends on it. Under the same hardware resources, the one with
better processing capability, e.g., detection rate, has better resources consump-
tion performance.
• Network Reconfigurations : Programmable virtual networking system in the
cloud environment provides the IPS a flexible way to reconfigure the virtual
networking system and provide a secure traffic inspection and control. How
to incorporate the Deep-Packet Inspection (DPI) with fine-grained traffic con-
trol in the cloud virtual networking environment to reduce the intrusiveness to
normal traffic is a key research challenge.
• Service Provisioning : IDS/IPS are generally provided and administrated by the
cloud system administrator to guarantee the security of the system. However,
to guarantee the privacy of the users’ traffic and efficiency of the security ap-
plication, IDS/IPS are expected to be provided as a cloud service so that users
can claim the IDS/IPS service within their virtual networking domain. The
IDS/IPS service is also expected to be elastic, which means that the resources
of the IDS/IPS can be dynamically adjusted to meet the demand of traffic.
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Chapter 4
MOBICLOUD: A GEO-DISTRIBUTED MOBILE CLOUD COMPUTING
PLATFORM
Figure 4.1: MobiCloud Resource Distribution Map
Motivated by the research challenges and objective discussed in chapter 3, it is
essential to propose a cloud provisioning platform by considering mobile users and
experimenters to solve the problems raised by the emergence of the popular geo-
distributed cloud systems. I propose the MobiCloud, a geo-distributed MCC re-
source provisioning system. The major contributions of this work are summarized
as below. I design the MobiCloud framework, define the service model, and propose
a novel extension model CaaS. Then, the components are implemented and a geo-
distributed infrastructure is established. A concrete example on how to experience
the MobiCloud system is given to better understand what MobiCloud can provide.
MobiCloud is a geo-distributed MCC service provisioning platform including elastic
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computing, secure storage, and layer-2 and above networking capabilities. This plat-
form is currently connecting three sites located at ASU 1, UMKC 2 in the US and
OCU 3 in Japan, respectively. Several sites in Paris and Beijing are under establish-
ment to be joined to the MobiCloud system. A Cloud resource distribution map can
be seen in Fig. 4.1.
4.1 System Components
The prototype of the proposed MobiCloud system has been established and can be
found in Fig. 4.2. I partition the MobiCloud system into different types of components
including computing, storage, administrative and networking ones.
Computing Component. The computing component is the entity providing
1Arizona State University
2University of Missouri − Kansas City
3Osaka City University
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the computing resources, i.e., Cloud host. The major difference among different com-
puting components depends on the virtualization technology being adopted. The
virtualization in MobiCloud is based on XEN that has an impressive scalability and
efficiency. A Cloud system can provide more logically separate resources upon the vir-
tualization layer. Usually, Cloud resources in one domain are grouped into a resource
pool that always has at least one physical node known as the master node. Other
physical nodes that join existing pools are described as slave nodes. Only the master
node exposes an administration interface and forwards commands to individual slaves
as necessary.
Storage Component. Storage stores all the resource images and users’ data.
Resource is prepared by cloning resource templates that are stored in the storage
repository. I choose to establish a remote storage repository, Network File System
(NFS), to manage the storage of resources in the Cloud system. An NFS storage
server is connected to the computing server via a switch that greatly increases the
scalability of storage.
Administrative Component. Dedicated physical servers are for administrating
resources and monitoring the network traffic within and across the domains. There
is also a set of internal functional servers serving different administrative purposes,
i.e., web service, DHCP, DNS, authentication service, database service, VPN, etc.
Networking Component. Control plane and data plane are isolated based on
the multi-network design of the MobiCloud. In Fig. 4.2, there are 4 networks in
each cluster. The incoming and outgoing traffic switches isolate the control traffic
(i.e., resource access, OS update, and package download) coming into or going out of
the MobiCloud Gateway. The data network switch is a managed switch with VLAN
supported that enables VMs from different physical servers to reside in the same
virtual domain. Lastly, the Cloud management network is connecting the internal
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management and monitoring server and NFS. Each Cloud server is installed with an
Open vSwitch with which the data traffic between two VMs in the same physical
server does not need to go through the physical data network switch out of the Cloud
host.
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Figure 4.3: Processing flows in MobiCloud
4.2 Implementation Flow
After the framework is designed and the infrastructure is established, I implement
the system to provide resource provisioning services to users. The implementation
flow is defined in terms of three major aspects, registration, requesting resources and
accessing the system. These three procedures can be found in Fig. 4.3.
• Registration. Anyone who wants to use the MobiCloud system must have a
valid account. Users have to register an account by visiting the MobiCloud por-
tal. After users create an account, the account credential will be automatically
stored in the ID and Credential Management Service, which is implemented by
the Kerberos based Active Directory, and dedicated Databased Service.
• Requesting Resource. After users’ credentials are authenticated, users are
authorized to request resources at the Resource Allocation & Management Ser-
vice. Although all services are hosted in the MobiCloud private domain, I still
introduce a DMZ to enhance the security of the Cloud resources. The Database
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service stores all related information of newly created resources, and the Net-
work Management Service prepares and configures the network attributes of
the resources. So far, the network Management Service consists of DHCP and
Dynamic DNS. Users are also able to configure the network attributes of re-
sources by themselves, which is the reason why the Remote Configure Service
is developed.
• Accessing Resource. When users are about to access their allocated resource,
they have to connect to the VPN server through the gateway first. The VPN
server authenticates the users’ accounts at the ID&Credential Management Ser-
vice where users’ account credentials are stored. After connecting to the VPN,
users’ mobile devices are assigned with the MobiCloud private internal IP ad-
dress and are free to access their resource by using the corresponding domain
name that was assigned for each VM.
4.3 System Extension Model: CaaS (Cluster as a Service)
MobiCloud is not only designed for general mobile users but also for developers
and researchers who may want to have more control on the Cloud system. Thus,
I propose a novel system extension model called Cluster as a Service (CaaS), with
which users can setup their own cluster joining the MobiCloud umbrella and easily
turn their roles from service consumers to service providers. You do not have to have
all equipment (as shown in Fig. 4.2), but some necessary ones with which everything
needed in the cluster can be easily reproducible. I package all functional servers (i.e.,
DHCP, DNS, Database, etc.) into Virtual Appliances (VAs), so that users just simply
import the image files and turn them into functional virtual servers. To configure the
network, i.e., VLAN creation and tunnel setup, a set of scripts running on XEN Dom
0 are prepared.
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Figure 4.4: NetFlow Monitoring Top Protocol
There are two types of system extension configurations, full-cluster and semi-
cluster. Full-cluster exactly duplicates the cluster at ASU. Physical Xen servers,
general switches, an OpenFlow switch, and a public IP address are needed. The
semi-cluster provider does not even need to have the OpenFlow switch and other
physical devices, but a single PC supporting Intel-VT or AMD-V with access to the
Internet. A dynamic DNS configuration can help the cluster to be accessed from
public. To establish the layer-2 connection (GRE tunnel) to other clusters, users just
need to use the Open vSwitch residing in the Xen Dom 0. With this CaaS extension
model, the MobiCloud system becomes more extensible and scalable.
4.4 System Resource Monitoring
As system administrators, to better monitor the performance of both network
and Cloud hosts in the MobiCloud and track the ongoing and potential issues exist-
ing in the system, I introduce a multi-layers monitoring mechanism, that is enabled
by sFlow and NetFlow [42]. NetFlow provides limited visibility, focusing on layer-3
network connections, while sFlow provides comprehensive visibility into network and
system resources needed to manage performance in virtualized and Cloud environ-
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ments. In each Open vSwitch in Dom 0 of each Cloud server, I enable not only sFlow
at the switch level but also at the host level, which means not only can the traffic
be monitored, but also the host performance (i.e., CPU utilization, memory usage,
virtual disk I/O, etc.) can be monitored.
From the analyzer of both NetFlow ManageEngine and sFlow Flowtrend [8, 7],
network parameters, e.g., top conversation, top connections, most popular protocols,
etc., can be monitored. Fig. 4.4 is the NetFlow captured top protocol statistic chart
for one hour at the ASU site. The chart shows that the top two protocols of HTTP
and NFS correspond to two spikes in the website and read activity on the virtual
machine. The third top traffic is the unknown application including communication
between Open vSwitch and its controller and other internal control messages. The
following traffic, which is almost control traffic including ssh, https, GRE tunnel and
bootp, etc., does not consume much bandwidth.
Besides layer-3 network monitoring, the sFlow is able to inspect the connection
relationship from the following three aspects shown in Fig. 4.5: internal connections,
external connections and non-IP connections. The left-top part of Fig. 4.5 shows the
internal connections that represent the internal topology at the ASU site where the
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connections between the Cloud server master node(10.0.0.3) and the storage server
(10.0.0.253) can be seen. The top-right part shows the layer-2 Non-IP connections
including unicast and broadcast. The bottom part shows the external connections
that indicate the inter-cluster connection among all three sites.
4.5 Experiencing the MobiCloud
In this section, I present the implementation of the MobiCloud through a simple
example of its use. Through the developed web interface, users are free to realize
all operations (register, request resource, and access resource) I mentioned in the
previous section.
Table 4.1: Single VM Creation Specification
VM Host Configuration
VM name Define the name of the VM.
OS Type Specify the Operation System of VM. Since I use Xen Hypervi-
sor, which supports a wide range of guest OS including Windows,
Linux, Solaris, and various versions of the BSD operating systems.
Hard Disk Size Specify the size of the virtual hard disk on each VM. There are
several options ranging from 8GB to 128GB.
Ram Size Specify the size of the memory. The range of memory can be
selected from 128MB to 4GB.
VM Network Configuration
NIC configure Specify the IP address, netmask and default GW.
4.5.1 Single VM Creation
I design three types of users to be registered. Each type of user has its own
privilege. 1. Free users: multiple users share one VM; 2. Basic users: each user is
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.6: Single VM Creation
provided with a dedicated VM with limited resources; 3. Premier users: each user is
provided with one or multiple VMs that are configurable. After registering an account
at the MobiCloud system, users are free to claim resources from the Cloud servers.
Here I use a premier user account, which has full privileges, to demonstrate how a
single VM creation is processed. The interface is shown in Fig. 4.6(a). To create the
single VM, there are several fields to be configured by users that can be referenced in
Table 4.1.
After a user specifies all the parameters in the corresponding fields, VM will be
created at the backend side. One of the advantages of MobiCloud over current existing
platforms is that the response time of the resource preparation is swift. Because the
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Figure 4.7: Virtual Network Creation
VM template is already prepared, what the system only needs to do involves two
steps: 1) fast copy the VM template and 2) configure the VM. When the VM is done
being prepared, users can use the management interface, shown in Fig. 4.6(b), to
manage their VM. There are several options including restart, resume, suspend, stop,
and remove. Each VM will be assigned with a unique domain name, in the format
of username.mobicloud.asu.edu that is registered in the DNS system. A Single VM
can also be set as a proxy of a mobile device to enhance the its capability. For
example, users can set their VMs as the proxy with an anti-virus function enabled,
which greatly enhances the security of the mobile device.
4.5.2 Virtual Network Creation
Besides single VM creation, users are also allowed to claim multiple VMs connect-
ing as virtual networks. The interface can be seen in Fig. 4.7. Users can simply click,
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drag, and drop on the canvas to create their desired network components and connect
them. There are three major components in the network creation canvas, desktop,
switch, and router. Users can configure the component in a pop-up window. Beside
the virtual hardware configuration (i.e., CPU, memory, harddisk, etc.), network in-
formation can also be configured, including creating virtual interfaces, IP addresses,
netmasks, default gateways, etc. I use a switch component to represent VLAN to par-
tition the network. Users can drag lines to connect two or more components (i.e., desk-
top or router) through a switch, which means those interfaces are in the same VLAN
and isolated from others. The router is the last component with routing functions
enabled by a software-based pre-installed router (Vyatta [11]). After user confirms
the topology by clicking the submit button, a summary page, indicating all hardware
and network information of VMs is presented. When the preparation is done, a re-
source page is returned with the detail of the resource created. Each VM is assigned
a unique domain name that is similar to the single VM creation case. But each user
can have multiple VMs, so that I choose the domain naming scheme in the format of
username-networkname-number.mobicloud.asu.edu to identify the VM. For example,
user cnsm2012 creates a network named mynetwork including three VMs, the domain
name assigned to the first VM is cnsm2012-mynetwork-1.mobicloud.asu.edu.
4.5.3 Accessing the Resources
After the resources are prepared, users are free to access the resources via either
fixed terminal (i.e., desktop) or a mobile device (i.e., Smartphone, tablets, etc.).
There is a VPN server running behind the MobiCloud firewall to provide access to
resources for users. Resources (VMs) are enabled with SSH and VNC service that
can be used to access the VM. Besides the fixed device, users are also able to access
the resources by using the mobile devices built-in function to access VPN (shown in
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(a)                                             (b)                                           (c)
Figure 4.8: Accessing VPN on (a) iOS and (b) android, accessing VM via VNC on
iOS
Fig.4.8 (a) (b) for iOS and Android OS). After connecting to the VPN, the device
will be assigned with a private IP address that is in the same subnet with resources.
Fig. 4.8(c) is an example of accessing the virtual desktop of resources from an iOS
smartphone.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
MobiCloud is always aiming to provide resources with expected user experience.
Thus, two metrics are mainly considered to benchmark the system performance, re-
source preparation time and available bandwidth among resources. To make the
performance evaluation result approach the real capacity, I test both metrics by us-
ing the Cloud server and network device with about a 70% load of the full capacity.
Since VM is the major type of resource to be provided in the system, the preparation
time of VM is directly related to user satisfaction. Thus, to evaluate the VM prepa-
ration performance, I choose the five most popular used guest OS in the system that
are CentOS 5.5, Ubuntu 10.04 (with and without desktop GUI), Windows 7, and
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Windows XP. The preparation time can be divided into two aspects, creation and
reboot. Creation time refers to the time from clicking the create button to returning
the confirmation page. The VM preparation includes not only the VM boot proce-
dure, but also some back-end configuration steps (e.g., find and clone the template,
domain name registration, and etc.). Besides the first time VM creation, I also eval-
uate the VM reboot time that indicates how fast the user can refresh the resources.
From Fig. 4.9, the VM preparation time varies due to different guest OS and are
all in the acceptable even decent range. The reason why creation time is more than
reboot time is that creation needs more configuration steps I discussed above.
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Figure 4.9: VM Preparation Performance
Users also need their resources to be distributed in the system to construct their
specific application or service. Thus, I test the bandwidth between resources at
different scenarios (in-cluster mode and in-server mode), to see how freely resources
can communicate with each other. Currently, the geo-distributed system does not
have a large scale, the bandwidth between different clusters varies due to different
link conditions and is not representative. So I am not considering the bandwidth
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among clusters, but just the two cases mentioned above. In-cluster mode tests the
bandwidth between two VMs in the same cluster but different physical servers. These
two VMs are usually in the layer-2 connection through a physical switch. In-server
mode tests the bandwidth between two VMs in the same physical server. They are
connected internally through the Open vSwitch. I test the TCP bandwidth for 10
times for each mode and the result can be found in Fig. 4.10. From the result,
the bandwidth performance between resources in both modes does not show much
difference. The average bandwidth for the in-cluster mode and in-server mode is
89.1 and 74.0 Mbits/s, respectively, which is sufficient for most normal application or
experiments.
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Chapter 5
CONSTRUCTING VIRTUAL NETWORKS IN A GEO-DISTRIBUTED
PROGRAMMABLE LAYER-2 NETWORKING ENVIRONMENT (G-PLANE)
G-Plane is primarily based on MobiCloud system and is more focused on the
virtual network manipulation and case study in a geo-distribtued cloud networking
environment.
5.1 Virtual Network Construction
Resources in G-Plane are mainly in the form of VMs, connected as a network.
The resource network can be created by different configurations due to different re-
quirements: 1) a single physical server, 2) multiple servers with one cluster (servers
in the same cluster are connected through a layer-2 physical switch), and 3) multiple
servers belong to different clusters.
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OpenFlow Switch/
Router (OFS)
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Physical Managed 
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Router (OFS)
Physical Managed 
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Figure 5.1: Intra- & Inter-Domain Network Architecture
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5.1.1 Intra-Cluster Network Creation
Intra-Cluster means that there is always a native layer-2 connection among all
resources within the the same cluster. To create a virtual network within the same
cluster, VLAN technology is deployed. As I previously mentioned, it is inefficient
to forward packets through the managed switch from one VM to another one in
the same physical resource provisioning server. Therefore, each XenServer has an
internal Open vSwitch enabled to handle traffic inside the physical server as shown
in Fig. 5.1. Open vSwitch is designed to enable massive network automation through
programmatic extensions, while still supporting standard management interfaces and
protocols (e.g. NetFlow, sFlow, RSPAN, ERSPAN, CLI, LACP, 802.1ag, etc.). Open
vSwitch can operate as a software-based switch running within the hypervisor (Xen
Dom 0), in which many security control functions can be implemented. With Open
vSwitch enabled, a packet sent from one VM to another one within the same physical
server does not need to be exposed out of the physical box. When a virtual network
is created within the same cluster but across different physical servers, a packet sent
from one VM to another one on a different server should go through the physically
managed switch by enabling trunk ports. The virtual network containing multiple
VMs in different physical servers is simply created by assigning the same VLAN ID
so that it is virtually isolated from other resources.
5.1.2 Inter-Cluster Network Creation
To enable provisioning of virtual network across clusters in G-PLaNE, I establish
a layer-2 GRE tunnel among each site by deploying OpenFlow switch running on top
of NetFPGA box. After a layer-2 tunnel is established, VLAN can function well upon
a layer-2 tunnel since it is a 2.5 layer technology strictly speaking. Although there are
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some options to establish the layer-2 tunnel, I choose the OpenFlow solution since it
is user-centric and can be easily extended due to its programmability. OpenFlow is an
open standard that enables researchers to run experimental protocols. In a classical
router or switch, the fast packet forwarding (data path) and the high level routing
decisions (control path) occur on the same device. An OpenFlow switch separates
these two functions. The data path portion still resides on the switch, while high-
level routing decisions are moved to a separate controller, typically a standard server.
The OpenFlow switch and controller communicate via the OpenFlow protocol, which
defines messages, such as packet-received, send-packet-out, modify-forwarding-table,
get-stats, etc. The data path of an OpenFlow switch presents a clean flow table
abstraction; each flow table entry contains a set of packet fields to match, and an
action (such as send-out-port, modify-field, or drop).
5.2 Enabling Additional Research Capabilities
With the virtual network provisioning service provided, users are able to expand
their own development and research work. There are some representative ones listed
below:
• Routing Algorithm & Protocol Design. Because I provide resources at
the IaaS level, users have more flexibility and privilege on their claimed re-
sources. Each virtual machine can be easily turned into a general virtual router
or OpenFlow switch by installing a software-based routing suite. Thus, exper-
imenters and researcher can have a real network environment in any possible
topology they expect. With the capability of modifying the entire routing pro-
tocol or algorithms module, research on routing protocols and other networking
layer mechanisms can be investigated, tested and measured in a real networking
environment.
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• Distributed Application Development. G-PLaNE users can use any IP
connected device to communicate with their VMs supporting a variety of OS.
So it enables developers to develop Cloud based applications on both the Cloud
side and the mobile device side. Moreover, after the virtual network resources
have been provided, more complicated networking and distributed applications
can be developed and tested in a real distributed networking environment.
• Distributed Security and Privacy Model. There is some research work [63]
deploying a Cloud to help users keep from viruses and enhance security. Cloud
based anti-virus engines have been emerging and are being studied. If users are
able to control a virtual network rather than a single VM or multiple isolated
VMs, then an advanced model can be investigated. For example, different anti-
virus engines can be placed onto different VMs and a centralized control VM
running some algorithm to coordinate them, is expected to enhance efficiency
to some extent. Generally speaking, any security and privacy research issues
can be investigated in a real distributed environment that G-PLaNE provides.
5.3 Case Study: SeRViTR
The G-PLaNE system is designed to be able to support research in a virtual
networking environment. In this section, I present a case study on how to utilize the
G-PLaNE system to generate and manage virtual domains between geo-distributed
platforms.
5.3.1 SeRViTR Architecture Overview
A trustworthiness model for future networks called the Virtual Trust Routing
and Provisioning Domain (VTRouPD)[40] has recently been proposed. Trustwor-
thiness can be defined in many facets. From the viewpoint of a network, it means
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routing information must be confidential, secured, and protected, whereas from the
service provider’s perspective, trustworthiness of service assures that the service is
safe and exclusive of anonymous users. Due to such variety of trustworthiness, a
network should be sliced into multiple virtual domains that are isolated from each
other. A VTRouPD is constructed by a collection of networking resources includ-
ing routers and switches based on virtualization techniques; e.g., constructing virtual
managed domains through tunneling and VLAN technologies. Within one or multiple
VTRouPDs, I can further create flow or application level virtual routing domains that
are denoted as µVTRouPDs[40]. In my recent work [52], the intra- and inter-domain
policy and trust management between VTRouPDs within the SeRViTR architecture
is discussed.
Fig.5.2 presents an overview of the SeRViTR system architecture. The figure
presents two VTRouPDs that are geo-distributed clusters at two places: Arizona
State University and the University of Missouri - Kansas City. Each VTRouPD is a
overall domain with the administrative control, and it may contain multiple Virtual
Domains. Here, I will only give a very high level description on SeRViTR components
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along with their relations; The detailed functions of the SeRViTR system can be found
in [52].
Packet flows to Virtual Domains in the SeRViTR architecture are differentiated
based on trustworthiness policies, and the Policy Manager plays a key role on setting
up policies along with establishing Virtual Domains. First, it sends policy rules to
the VTRouPD Manager to make a request of Virtual Domain creation or deletion.
Second, it communicates with the Flow Controller about flow updating. A VTRouPD
Manager manages the information of physical routers within the VTRouPD, and
it is responsible for the creation or deletion of Virtual Domain as well as resource
management. The Flow Controller is placed at the edge of VTRouPDs, and it is in
charge of forwarding flows to correct Virtual Domains based on the policy.
5.3.2 SeRViTR Deployment on G-PLaNE
The core idea behind SeRViTR is constructing the network by setting up policies
to assure secured routing between virtual domains across multiple sites. To achieve
such a goal, SeRViTR has to be deployed in a virtual networking environment that
is well supported by the G-PLaNE system.
The G-PLaNE system allows the cluster to be scalable. Take the SeRViTR clusters
at ASU and UMKC for example, presented in Fig. 5.2; here, two VTRouPDs are
created at different clusters. I have established a layer-2 GRE tunnel between the
two VTRouPDs through OpenFlow switches. Within the cluster at each site, the
G-PLaNE resource pool contains physical XenServers where VMs are created. Recall
that all VMs can be created and deployed as any form of functional entities; thus, I
can customize VMs as dedicated SeRViTR functional components as well as virtual
routers. Particularly, VTRouPD Managers, Flow Controllers, and Policy Managers
are implemented on VMs created on one XenServer from the resource pool.
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The virtual routing domain is a vital constituent part in the SeRViTR architec-
ture design, and it requires good isolation as well as scalability when constructing
virtual networks. With the G-PLaNE system data network switch, which is VLAN
supported, VMs can be grouped into different virtual domains by tagging VLAN IDs,
and the ones which have been used can be queried through the database of the G-
PLaNE system. Fig. 5.1 shows a high level virtual domain creation by grouping VMs
into the distinct VLANs. Particularly, consider cluster A at ASU in Fig. 5.2, where
four XenServers are reserved from the resource pool for creating virtual routers. On
each XenServer, I can customize an arbitrary number of VMs as dedicated virtual
routers by deploying a routing suit (i.e. OpenFlow switch, Quagga, etc) on it. Now,
consider the SeRViTR virtual domains. The PolicyManager-VM sends a request
along with a trustworthiness policy to announce the creation of a new virtual domain
to the VTRouPDManager-VM. The VTRouPDManager-VM, in turn, communicates
with every XenServer that is reserved for creating VMs as virtual routers and sends
out an unused VLAN ID. When creating VMs, the XenServer will add this unused
VLAN ID through its API. Therefore, VMs (Virtual Routers) created by distinct
XenServers can be put into the same VLAN according to the unique VLAN ID. The
data network switch will enable the intra- or inter-virtual domain communications.
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Chapter 6
MOBILE CLOUD USER-CENTRIC MODEL
After a comprehensive literature review on the existing MCC services in terms of
computing, storage, security, context awareness, etc. I firstly summarized and defined
three types service model based on the existing MCC services, and proposed a new
user-centric MCC service model called Representor as a Service (RaaS).
6.1 Current Mobile Cloud Service Models
Current Internet clouds have been broadly classified in three-type service models:
Infras-tructure-as-a-service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-
Service (SaaS). They are classified according to the layers of virtualization. However,
due to the involvement of both CPS and CVS, the MCC’s service models are more
appropriate to be classified according to the roles of computational entities within
its service framework, where the classification of MCC service models can use the
roles and relations between mobile entities and their invoked cloud-based resource
provisioning. Based on this view, existing MCC services can be classified in three
major models: Mobile-as-a-Service-Consumer (MaaSC), Mobile-as-a-Service-Provider
(MaaSP), and Mobile-as-a-Service-Broker (MaaSB). These MCC service models are
illustrated in Fig. 6.1, in which arrows indicate service processing flows from service
providers to service recipients.
MaaSC is originated from the traditional client-server model. It was enhanced
by introducing virtualization, fine-grained access control, and other cloud-based tech-
nologies at the initial stage. Mobile devices can outsource their computation and
storage functions onto the cloud in order to achieve better performance, and more
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Figure 6.1: Current Service Models of MCC
application capabilities. In this architecture, the service flow is in an one-way fashion.
It is from the cloud to mobile devices and mobile devices are service consumers. Most
existing MCC services fall into this category.
MaaSP is different from MaaSC in that the role of a mobile device is shifted from
a service consumer to a service provider. For example, with on-board sensors, i.e.,
GPS module, camera, gyroscope, etc., mobile devices are able to sense data from
the devices and their neighboring environment, and further provide sensing services
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to other mobile devices through the cloud. In Fig. 6.1, consumers receive services
provided by both the cloud and mobile devices. The types of services provided by
mobile devices are diverse based on their sensing and processing capabilities.
MaaSB can be considered as an extension of MaaSP, where MaaSB provides
networking and data forwarding services for other mobile devices or sensing nodes.
MaaSB is desired under some circumstances because mobile devices usually have lim-
ited sensing capability compared to sensors that are dedicated for specially designed
functionalities and sensing locations. For example, mobile phones can be used to
collect users’ physical activities from Nike Fuelband [61]. MaaSB extends the cloud
edges to mobile devices and wireless sensors. Thus, a mobile device can be configured
as a gateway or a proxy providing networking services through various communication
approaches such as 3/4G, Bluetooth, WiFi, etc. Moreover, the proxy mobile device
can also provide security and privacy protections to their interfaced sensors.
6.2 Design Principles of User-centric Mobile Cloud Computing
Future MCC should be re-considered as a new service model, where mobile agents,
i.e., both physical and virtual entities, and related resources collectively operate as
mobile clouds that enable computing, storage and networking capabilities, context
awareness modeling, content discovery, data collection and dissemination. To build
the future user-centric mobile cloud computing based on the described concepts and
requirements, mobile clouds should be shifted from the traditional Internet cloud by
using the following principles:
• Principle 1: User-centric: MCC applications should be designed in a way that
user can control their own data and activities with strong privacy and security
protection. Cloud resources should be collected and allocated according to
mobile applications customized for each individual user.
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• Principle 2: Service-oriented application platform: Due to the symmetric ser-
vice model, every mobile node can potentially serve as an MCC service provider,
and thus service-oriented application platform is the natural choice for MCC.
• Principle 3: Mobility efficiency: MCC resources should be dynamically allo-
cated and managed according to the need of mobile cloud applications. Mobility
of MCC should be confined through a set of mobile cloud application constrains
to maximize the efficiency using a set of system performance evaluation met-
rics such as availability, computing power, storage, and their spacial-temporal
boundaries.
• Principle 4: Virtual representation: MCC maintains a trusted, reliable, and
accessible virtual representation for each user. The virtualized representation
can be considered as an assistant for mobile users and performs actions such as
sensing a user’s daily activity to build user’s behavior and activity profiles, and
delegate the user’s activities in the virtual environment.
6.3 Mobile-as-a-Representer: A User-Centric Approach
Cloud Resource
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Phyical 
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Figure 6.2: Mobile-as-a-Representor (MaaR)
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6.3.1 MaaR Model Basic
Besides previously presented service models, i.e., MaaSC, MaaSP and MaaSB, and
user-centric MCC design principles, I present a new user-centric MCC service model
called Mobile-as-a-Representor (MaaR). The architecture of MaaR can be found in
Fig. 6.2. In MaaR, each user can be represented by a virtualized entity in the cloud
through his/her physical entity (i.e., mobile device). Users’ behaviors and attributes
can be collected from the real world (people, environment or mobile devices) in real
time and sent to their corresponding virtual entities in the cloud to perform further
analysis and processing. Data mining and machine learning algorithms can be used
to analyze a mobile users situation and perform actions proactively. MaaR can be
regarded as the next-generation MCC service model in that both physical systems
and virtual systems are seamlessly integrated through virtualization technologies to
provide services. In MaaR, the mobile devices and clouds are highly interactive, and
as a result, the service flow can be presented as bidirectional arrows. In addition to
help mobile entities execute tasks more efficiently, MaaR is able to accomplish some
tasks that are impossible to be realized in current MCC architecture.
MaaR model is presented to support the next-generation user-centric MCC ser-
vices and applications. A conceptual architecture of MaaR is presented in Fig. 6.3,
where both CPS and CVS are integrated as a whole system. In the CPS, hetero-
geneous networks co-exist and all these networks can be virtualized at the CVS by
performing operations including presenting, offloading, abstracting, caching, migra-
tion, etc. All data with the spatial, temporal, and correlation information from the
CPS will be submitted to the CVS. Among all these three types of information, corre-
lation information is essential in that it helps to fuse different types of data together
into a well formatted one so that the CVS can further perform context awareness,
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user-centric proactive and security protection tasks. For example, the sensor network
carries sensed data while social network collects and generates the social relationship
data. The correlation information helps the CVS to generate sensing data with social
attributes (e.g., personal data that is only accessible from a specific social group, like
people in the users friend list).
In MaaR, the CVS has three main types of provisioning resources: computing re-
source, storage resource, and networking resource. User’s virtual entity is represented
by maintaining seamless communication between the CPS and the CVS, which also
allows for establishing multiple personalized MCC clouds due to different application
purposes. A MCC application is able to control integration of CPS and CVS through
a well-defined API and MCC tools. Traditional Internet cloud is one-way operational
as users can only submit data from the CPS to the CVS while it is possible to al-
low the CVS to further control the CPS functions in a highly adaptive and dynamic
fashion based on the MaaR model. Besides physical data being virtualized to virtual
environment, the CVS can provide feedback and control functions in the CPS.
To enable the service-oriented application running environment, MaaR provides
POEM (Personal On-demand execution Environment for Mobile cloud computing)
framework [82] to achieve the user-centric MCC service running platform highlighted
in Fig. 6.3. POEM is a mobile cloud application execution platform that enables
mobile devices to easily discover and compose cloud resources for their applications.
For mobile resource providers, they may not even know what applications and who
may call their provisioned functions beforehand. In this way, the mobile application
design should not be application-oriented; instead, it should be functionality-oriented
(or service-oriented). To achieve these features, I can consider those Provisioning
Functions (PFs) as the fundamental application components in the MaaR model,
which can be composed by mobile cloud service requesters in runtime.
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POEM takes a comprehensive approach by incorporating the OSGi-based [65]
service-oriented architecture into the mobile cloud computing. It treats the offload-
ing as part of service composition, and as a result, the codes (or computation tasks)
are considered as services provided by mobile devices and the cloud. In this way,
offloading and migration operations can be multi-directional (i.e., among mobile de-
vices and the cloud) compared to one-directional (i.e., from a mobile device to the
cloud) in previous solutions. Moreover, due to the popular Java-based OSGi frame-
work, POEM can greatly improve the adoption of the SoA-based code reuse and
composition for mobile cloud computing.
6.4 An Application Scenario based on User-centric MaaR model
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Figure 6.3: MaaR Conceptual Architecture
To better understand the proposed future MaaR model, I introduce a vehicular
video sensing and collaboration application as an example. It is assumed that MaaR
service modules are already equipped on many users’ smartphones. When user Alice
is driving, her smartphone uses onboard sensors like camera or GPS to detect her
location, driving speed, and image/video captured on the road. Those collected
information can be collected and virtualized into the CVS to construct a virtual
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representation of the mobile device in the cloud for Alice, which is the essence of
MaaR in that the virtual representor represents the real situation of the physical
user. Practically, the representor is implemented through a set of software agents
(i.e., OSGi bundles) on a dedicated VM allocated for Alice, where Alice has the
administrative privilege on the VM to decide what data can be shared and protected
(by encryption). The dedicated VM is the application holder for Alice to incorporate
various data processing models and functions for security, data mining, and intelligent
situation-awareness decision making that are personalized for the uses of Alice. In
this model, the VM can be hosted in public or private cloud as the choice of Alice.
User Bob may want to know what is the current traffic status around the bridge
5 miles ahead where Alice is driving through. Users with MaaR services running
on their mobile devices near the bridge can provide sensing functions, e.g., GPS,
video/camera, which are searchable by Bob so that Bobs display function can call
those functions in real-time through either direct P2P connections or a centralized
traffic monitoring function provided by a third party. In addition to the presented
video capturing usage of the application, MaaR services and applications can also
maintain social diagrams for each user. For example, when Bob is driving in the
area during the lunchtime, the MaaR service representor of Bob can prepare for
suggestions such as good nearby restaurants with high rates by Bobs trusted friends.
Other suggestions may relate to Bobs daily activities and job functions according to
his current location, and provide promptly when Bob needs them. These personalized
suggestions are based on correlating the location and various sensed data by the MaaR
service representor.
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Chapter 7
SDNIPS: ENABLING A SDN-BASED INTRUSION PREVENTION SYSTEM IN
CLOUDS
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Figure 7.1: The SDNIPS System Architecture.
7.1 SDNIPS: Design and Implementation
In this section, I present the designed architecture including components and the
processing flow of the SDNIPS, which is then followed by the Network Reconfiguration
(NR). The architecture and components are presented in Fig. 7.1.
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7.1.1 Overall Architecture and Components
Cloud Cluster is the major component hosting cloud resources and the environ-
ment where the proposed SDNIPS is applied. A cloud cluster can contains one or
multiple cloud servers with major cloud-based OS installed. The established system
is based on XenServer that is an efficient parallel virtualization solution on top of the
bare metal. There are two types of domains in XenServer cloud OS: Dom 0 and Dom
U. Dom 0 is the management domain while Dom U is the user domain. I introduce
one Dom U dedicated for administrative purpose to place controller and log compo-
nent, while all other Dom Us are for hosting Virtual Machines (VMs) for users. All
Dom U resources are managed by Dom 0 and must go through Dom 0 to access the
hardware.
Open vSwitch (OVS) is the pure software implementation of the OpenFlow
switch. OVS is usually implemented in the management domain or privilege domain
of the cloud system. In my designed prototype, OVS is natively implemented in the
Dom 0 of XenServer cloud system. Communications among different VMs in the
same physical server only need to be managed and forwarded through OVS without
exposing the traffic out of the physical box. Each Dom 0 in Xenserver runs a user-
space daemon (flow path) as well as a kernel space module (fast path).
In user-space, there are two modules which are ovsdb-server and ovs-switchd. The
module ovsdb-server is the log-based database that holds switch-level configuration;
while the module ovs-switchd is the core OVS component that supports multiple in-
dependent data-paths (bridges). As shown in Fig. 7.1, ovs-switchd module is able
to communicate with ovsdb-server through management protocol, with controller
through OpenFlow protocol, and with kernel module through netlink. In the ker-
nel space, kernel module handles packet switching, lookup and forwarding, tunnel
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encapsulation and decapsulation. Every Virtual Interface (VIF) on each VM has a
corresponding virtual interface/port on OVS, and different virtual interface connect-
ing to the same bridge can be regarded on the same switch. For example, VIF 1.0
(the virtual port of eth0 on VM from Dom 1) has the layer 2 connection with VIF
2.0 (the virtual port of eth0 on VM from Dom 2). OVS forwards packets based on
the entries in flowtable as I mentioned in chapter 2.
Snort can be implemented in Dom 0 (privilege domain) or Dom U (unprivileged
domain) based on Xen virtualization architecture. In this work, I deploy the Snort in
Dom 0, which makes it natively detect the bridge in OVS and has better performance
[84]. All the logging information generated from the Snort is output into a CSV file
that controller can access in real time.
Controller is the component providing a centralized view and control over the
cloud virtual network. The controller contains three major components, SDNIPS
daemon, alert interpreter, and rules generator. SDNIPS daemon is mainly for col-
lecting alert data generated from Snort agent in Dom 0 of controlled SDN devices,
i.e., OVS. The SDNIPS daemon is implemented in the format of JSON message.
The alert information is stored in JSON message and the JSON server is running at
the controller side. Alert interpreter takes care of parsing the alert and targets the
suspect traffic. Several information is parsed out of the raw alert data, e.g., source
IP address, destination IP address, TCP port, etc. Then, the parsed and filtered
information is passed to rules generator that generates the rules to be injected to the
OpenFlow device to reconfigure the network.
7.1.2 Implementation
I have built up the prototype based on Xen-based cloud technology, Snort IDS
and OpenFlow-based SDN. I use Snort as the intrusion detection agent since it is one
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Figure 7.2: The SDNIPS Processing Flow.
of the best and dominating candidates on the market due to its high efficiency and
lightweight. Snort at Dom 0 is able to natively monitor all bridges on OVS. Dom U
is also possible to realize the Snort agent since the OVS can be configured as mirror
based thus Snort agent can keep listening all the traffic on whatever network it can
access. Based on the previous evaluation results, I install and properly configure the
Snort agent in the Dom 0 in each cloud server as shown in Fig. 7.1. Controller is
based on POX [38] and is implemented in a VM in Dom U. All the received Snort
alerts is stored in the CSV file that controller is reading in real time. Any alert
found in by the controller will be converted into flowtable entry to the OVS to take
corresponding actions to prevent the suspect traffic.
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7.1.3 SDNIPS Processing Flow
The processing flow of the SDNIPS is illustrated in Fig. 7.2. The network traffic is
generated from the cloud resources, i.e., VMs. All network traffic must be generated
from the VIFs that are attached to virtual bridges of OVS. The virtual bridge can be
regarded as the virtual switch, which means all VIFs connecting to the same bridge
are on the same network. Snort agent in Dom 0 has the advantage of directly detecting
through the bridge, which is more efficient than sniffing the traffic by utilizing the
SPAN technology. The SPAN port mirror technology duplicates all traffic on specified
ports and forwards to a dedicated port that the traffic sniffer tool is listening. When
any traffic matching the Snort rules is alerted into the log file, The SDNIPS daemon
will store the alert information in JSON format and send over to the JSON server
at controller side. After that, the alert interpreter will parse the alert information
and extract all necessary information, e.g., attack type, source IP, destination IP,
TCP port, etc. Finally, the rules generator will generate the OpenFlow rule entries
and push them to the OVS to update the flowtable. Therefore, the following suspect
traffic matching the newly updated flowtable entries will be swiftly handled with
valid countermeasures in the data plane of the OVS with line rate. Currently, I have
implemented the system described in Fig. 7.1.
7.2 SDNIPS vs Snort/Iptables IPS
Motivated by the limitation of the traditional IPS, e.g., Snort/Iptables IPS, in
chapter 3, SDNIPS is designed to take advantages of SDN to provide more counter-
measures to increase the flexibility and efficiency. This section discusses the com-
parison between the proposed SDNIPS and the Snort/Iptables IPS in terms of IPS
working mechanisms and new capabilities.
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Traditional IPS system is not specially designed for the cloud virtual networking
environment, but for a general network environment. The major difference between
the general network environment and the cloud virtual networking environment is
that the latter one usually has difference network domains, i.e., management net-
work domain and user network domain. User network is on top of the management
network, which means that the management network in the lower layer has better
performance. Thus, I design the SDNIPS especially for the cloud virtual networking
environment and take advantages of OVS in management domain in order to achieve
better performance.
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Two IPS solutions are different in terms of the essence, i.e., working mechanism
and operation level. Fig. 7.3 indicates the scenario on how the Iptables IPS (blue
lines) and SDNIPS (red lines) prevent the attacks. The number besides each line
represents the sequence of the packet flow. Solids lines and dot lines represent the
data traffic and control traffic respectively. For Snort/Iptables IPS, Snort needs to be
configured as inline mode and recompiled with Iptables. Besides detection engines,
one of most important components of the Iptables is the NFQUEUE, which is an
Iptables and Ip6tables target which delegate the decision on packets to a user-space
software. It then must issue a verdict on the packets. Since the Dom 0 has its
own packet handling mechanism, it is inefficient and unnecessary to implement the
Snort/Iptables IPS in Dom 0. Thus, placing it in Dom U should be the most practical
choice.
Additionally, it is noted that OVS in Dom 0 is the same as network stack in OS
kernel level, which means that OpenFlow feature is not enabled when the flowtable is
empty. As shown in Fig. 7.3, when attacking packets generated from attacker’s virtual
interface, all the packets need to be passed through Dom 0 before being forwarded to
the destination (line 1). When Snort detects any suspect traffic, it needs to inform the
NFQUEUE to take the actions defined in the rules. The Iptables IPS needs to consult
its brain (controller at application level), which then sends out control messages to
issue command (line 2 & 3).
Finally, the suspect packet is handled at Internet level kernel space at Dom U and
will be either forwarded to victim or dropped (line 4). Unlike the Snort/Iptables IPS,
SDNIPS stands out since both the detection engine and the packet processing are
natively deployed in Dom 0, which is dramatically efficient especially handling large
amount of traffic. When packets arrive at Dom 0 (line 1), Snort detection engines is
able to natively monitoring the bridges, even though the OVS controller is placed at
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Dom U, only few traffic between OVS at Dom 0 and controller at Dom U is generated
(line 2 & 3).
After the controller update the flowtable, all traffic with the same pattern will be
processed at OVS fast path in Dom 0 (line 4). From the Fig. 7.3, it is also obvious
that packets in Snort/Iptables IPS scenario need to be in and out the Dom 0 twice
while the SDNIPS only needs once to fulfill the same task. Although control message
in SDNIPS has further way to go than in Iptables IPS, the control message only
updates the flowtable at the first time when traffic is suspected and all the traffic will
be only handled by flowtable fast path at Dom 0 without interaction with controller
at Dom U. Thus, due to the IPS working mechanism, SDNIPS should significantly
outperformance any other Dom U IPS solution especially in cloud virtual networking
environment.
Since the accuracy is one of major concerns for detection engines, taking direct
actions on suspect traffic is not always an advisable choice since it may kill the healthy
and innocent traffics. With the network programmability feature enabled in cloud
virtual networking environment. The network for whole cloud environment can be
reconfigured to provide security protections. Fig. 7.3 represents the overall working
scenario of SDNIPS. The attacker generates malicious packets and sends to target
through OVS virtual bridge. When SDNIPS detection agent detects the packets
matching any rule and starts suspecting them, there are several possible network
reconfiguration actions need to be taken to lower the risk without directly killing
them through OpenFlow network programmable capability. All traffic in the cloud
system will not be forwarded until OVS allows to do so. There are mainly two ways
to handle the malicious traffic through network reconfiguration method, modify the
flowtable and rewrite the header of the packet at controller.
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Table 7.1: Network Reconfiguration Actions
No. Countermeasure
1 Traffic Redirection
2 QoS Adjustment
3 Traffic Isolation
4 Filtering
5 Block Port
6 Quarantine
7.3 Network Reconfiguration (NR)
Network reconfiguration is an approach to reconfigure the network characteristics
including topology, packet header, QoS parameters, etc. With the SDN concept
enabled in the cloud virtual networking environment, network reconfiguration can
be applied to construct the IPS system. Major network reconfiguration actions are
summarized in Table 7.1:
1. Traffic Redirection (TR) can redirect the traffic to designed destination, such as
a secure appliance (e.g. DPI unit, Honeypot) by rewriting the packet header.
TR is usually implemented by using MAC/IP address rewriting. Controller
can push entry to flowtable, which can take packet header rewriting action on
matching packets.
2. QoS Adjustment (QA) is a very efficient way to handle flood type of attacks.
OVS is able to adjust the QoS parameters of any attached VIF. After lower
the TX/RX rate, suspect attack traffic will generate less impact on the network
and hosts nearby. Sometimes, QA can be configured to work with other NR
like traffic isolation.
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3. Traffic Isolation (TI) is different from the traffic redirection in that TI provides
an isolated virtual networking channel separated from others, e.g., separated
virtual bridges, isolated ports or GRE tunnel. Malicious traffic will be only
impact any host on its isolated virtual channel and will not impact other normal
traffic.
4. Filtering is similar with the filter in Iptables, but they are different in that
filtering in NR will handled packets at OVS kernel space and will not forwarded
to a remote controller. MAC/IP address change is a very straightforward way
to prevent the victim from being attacked by the malicious traffic. The default
IPS action, i.e., drop, can be also regarded as a filtering rule that drop the
matching packets.
5. Some attacks are performed by exploring a certain port, especially a public
service port. By blocking those ports, the attack can be prevented as the
attacking path is disconnected.
6. Quarantine is a comprehensive mean to do the isolation in cloud virtual net-
working environment. It works similarly with TI but it isolates the suspect
network resources (not just the suspect traffic). Another difference between the
normal traffic isolation and quarantine is that more flexible self-defined policies
can be applied in quarantine mode. Quarantine can be also regarded as the
superset of many network reconfiguration set. For example, you can quarantine
suspect network targets, e.g., VMs, with only ingress permission and without
egress permission. Thus, such VM can only receive traffic but cannot generate
traffic to the network.
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Figure 7.4: The Network Reconfiguration Mechanism.
7.3.1 Representative NR Actions
Before introducing the NR actions, the default action taken by the IPS is block-
ing or dropping the malicious traffic. Since NIDS may have false positive and false
negative when judging the network packets, dropping packets is not always the best
strategy when facing the suspect traffic. In this section, I will discuss two represen-
tative NR actions besides the default IPS action, traffic redirection (TR) and QoS
Adjustment (QA). How dropping and other two NR actions work are displayed in
Fig. 7.4.
Traffic Redirection
There are three ways to implement the TR: MAC Address Rewriting, IP Address
Rewriting, and OVS Port Rewriting. When any suspect packet is detected, the
controller firstly pushes the OpenFlow entry (i.e., matching packet header fields and
corresponding actions) to OVS flowtable. When certain packets are matching specific
entries, then corresponding actions will be taken for matching packets. Actions can
be set as changing on any header field of the flowtable, e.g., source IP, destination IP,
source MAC, destination MAC.
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Traffic redirection mostly depends on the Destination Address (DA) field. When
destination IP or MAC address is changed, the OVS will naturally forward the packet
to the changed destination address in the packet header. This NR function is espe-
cially useful when dealing with the suspect packets, which cannot be judged as mali-
cious one for sure and are expected not to forward to possible victim but a detection
site for further checking, e.g., Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) or honeypot. As shown
in Fig. 7.4, the orange colored block represents the corresponding flowtable fields that
TR may change. Moreover, IP and MAC field rewriting can be combined with other
NR function to implement many network function, e.g., Network Address Translation
(NAT).
Beside the MAC and IP address change, there is another way to realize the TR,
port rewriting. This method is also natively enabled by OVS architecture. As shown
in Fig. 7.1, each bridge created in OVS can be regarded as a virtual switch. All VM
VIFs are connected to virtual bridges through virtual port (i.e., virtual interface).
Thus, by forwarding any packet to the virtual port, the VM VIF that connects to that
virtual port will be able to receive the forwarding packets. Through this mechanism,
SDNIPS is also able to set any virtual port as the output port of any packet to
implement the TR function without changing the packet header.
One benefit of using port rewriting is that any packet header will not be changed
while traffic redirection is being realized, which is very efficient and useful to some
components (e.g., security appliance) when collecting original network data for further
learning. To sum up, traffic can be redirected by OVS through multiple ways in cloud
environment.
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QoS Adjustment
QoS Adjustment (QA) is a desired feature when dealing with flood type of attack,
e.g., DoS and DDoS. When one or multiple victims are under stress from receiving
a huge amount of traffic from one or multiple sources, which cannot be confidently
determined as attackers, it is always expected to slow down the current extremely
fast flow and to determine if the traffic is malicious or not after further inspection.
Thus, QoS adjustment is an ideal way to handle such situation.
There are two ways to implement the QA, reset the QoS parameters on either VIF
or port on OVS. Setting the QoS limitation on VIF or OVS port has different applied
scenarios. When setting the QoS limitation on VIF, it is necessary to firstly locate
the packet source, e.g., the attacker. Thus, the number of suspect attackers would
better not be large. On the other hand, when there is a DDoS attack on the network,
the attack source may be a large set, which means it is infeasible and impractical to
locate all zombie attackers and adjust their VIFs. To solve this issue, I introduce a
smart way to implement the QoS for such situation, by limiting the incoming port
on OVS. When any packet arrived at OVS, it must have an event port also called in
port, as shown on the flowtable in Fig. 7.4.
The QoS of that incoming port can be limited so that any arriving packet exceeding
the QoS limit will be dropped without further process, which greatly enhances the
performance of QA. Also, attacker may deploy IP spoofing technology to modify the
source IP address of attacking packets to avoid being traced back. Thus, the best
way is to modify QoS parameters. I will not discuss the the QoS model based on the
network but just explore the capability provided by SDNIPS, because QoS issue can
be discussed as an individual research topic in its own area.
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7.3.2 NR Selection Policy
Table 7.2: SDNIPS Actions Selection Guidance
Major Actions DoC Cost Preferred Scenario
Drop High Low Any determined malicious traffic
TR Medium Medium Attacking traffic requiring further in-
spection
QA Low Medium Attacks with overwhelmed traffic, e.g.,
DoS
In Fig. 7.2, there is a component in SDNIPS controller called rules generator.
Rules generator is for choosing NR and generating the corresponding OpenFlow rules
based on the detection engine output. The rules can be generated based on different
algorithms that are not the focus of this work. Based on two representative NRs
I mentioned above and the default drop action, I am summarizing the IPS action
selection policy in Table 7.2.
Degree of Confidence (DoC) represents the degree of how confident the detection
engine believes the traffic is a malicious one. Since one of the biggest challenges of
NIDS is to reduce the false negative and false positive, it is impossible for a detection
engine to work with a 100% correctness. Several types of evidence, e.g., detection
engine signature, history behavior, machine learning result, etc., can lead to the con-
firmation of judging the real attack. Thus, when the traffic is suspected and the
detection engine cannot draw the conclusion that it is definitely the malicious traffic,
it is wise to choose the appropriate NR to keep the traffic alive and lower its possi-
ble dangerousness. Cost means the resources consumption in both the system and
network level when taking corresponding actions. Different actions consumes differ-
ent amount of resources due to the frequency of OpenFlow operation, e.g., updating
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flowtable, taking OpenFlow actions. In this way, it is possible to enumerate preferred
scenarios of attacks that can be counted by using certain NR setup.
Drop is the default NR and it has the lowest cost since when the packet match
the entry in flowtable, it will be simply dropped without any further actions. This
action is the best candidate to prevent the determined attacks with high DoC by
terminating the malicious packets.
Traffic Redirection (TR) is appropriate for the traffic with medium DoC. When
SDNIPS detects possible attacking traffic with a medium DoC, the traffic can be
redirected to a secure appliance, e.g., DPI proxy or Honeypot for further inspection
and learning. After the secure appliance further inspect the traffic, the traffic can
be possibly forwarded to the original destination or take other actions, e.g., drop.
Through the TR, the suspect traffic will not be forwarded to the original destination
until a further process is done. Since TR needs to use packet header or OVS port
rewriting technology for every single suspect packet matching the flowtable entry, it
costs more resource than simply drop action.
QoS Adjustment has two ways as I mentioned above, VIF based QA and virtual
port based QA. I am mainly focusing on the virtual port-based QA since it can be
applied to broader range of scenarios. QA is preferred for traffic with low DoC than
TR since the malicious packets with lower DoC can be sent to the original destination.
Packets with low DoC cannot be determined as the malicious one. Thus, such traffic
does not need to be dropped or redirected. QA costs similar amount of resource with
TR since all the packets need to be handled by OVS. QA is preferred for flood type
of attack with either few or large set of sources.
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7.4 Evaluation
7.4.1 Evaluation Environment
I establish the SDNIPS prototype by using one cloud server with OVS installed
and properly configured in Dom 0 which has 4 virtual CPUs. The detection engine in
Dom 0 can directly access the virtual bridges in OVS to monitor all tenant networks
while Snort/Iptables-based IPS agent in Dom U can only monitor the tenant network
where it is in. The OVS controller is implemented based on the POX controller [38].
All other components are placed in VMs.
Traditional Snort/Iptables IPS is implemented in a VM (Ubuntu 12.04 Server edi-
tion, 4 virtual CPUs and 2048 MB Memory) at Dom U. All VMs at Dom U are con-
figured with VIF with 10GbE maximum capacity whose actual bandwidth is around
8 Gbits/s based on our testing in the real XenServer virtual network environment. I
evaluate three major performance scenarios:
1. Performance comparison between placing detection engine in management do-
main and user domain;
2. Performance comparison between our proposed SDNIPS and traditional Snort/Iptables
IPS in terms of the attack prevention capability (I will simply use the term IPS
in the following to represent the Snort/Iptables one); and
3. Performance of the designed and developed NR functions to validate their fea-
sibility and efficiency.
In the evaluation, the traffic are generated by hacking tools and packet generators such
as [1, 4, 51, 2, 59] to mimic the real attack scenario in the cloud virtual networking
environment.
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7.4.2 Evaluation Results
1 5 10 15 20 25 50 100 200 250 300 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Traffic Load(Packet/s)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
C
P
U
 U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
(%
)
CPU Utilization Performance Comparison
Snort Agent in Dom 0
Snort Agent in Dom U
Figure 7.5: CPU Utilization Performance Comparisons.
NIDS Performance
Fig. 7.5 illustrates the performance comparison between Snort in Dom 0 and in
Dom U, measured by CPU Utilization. The traffic load is represented by the packets
sending speed from 1 to 5000 packets per second (pps). Both Dom 0 and Dom U
are configured with 4 virtual CPUs. The detection engine running in Dom U also
consumes computation resources in Dom 0 since Dom 0 is the management domain.
Thus, the CPU utilization is measured by the summation of CPU utilization of Dom
0 and Dom U. In sum, the performance of running the detection engine at Dom
0 consumes less CPU resources than in Dom U because Snort is able to natively
access all the network traffic through OVS bridge in Dom 0. Thus, based on the
70
evaluation in the Xen-based cloud environment, the conclusion can be drew that
deploying the Snort detection agent in Dom 0 has better performance than in Dom
U, which validates the SDNIPS design in Fig. 7.1. The main reason is that all the
traffics of Dom U need to go through OVS in Dom 0, and virtual resources in each
Dom U need to be routed to access the hardware resources through Dom 0. Thus
directly deploying the Snort agent in Dom 0 is more efficient in terms of both host
and network resource utilization.
OpenFlow-based IPS vs Iptables-based IPS
In this part, I compare the performance of proposed SDNIPS and one traditional IPS
candidate, i.e., Snort/Iptables IPS (mentioned as IPS as following). SDNIPS only de-
ploys the default NR action (drop) to make the comparison fair, since Snort/Iptables
IPS does not have extra NR capability besides drop.
Fig. 7.6 shows the health traffic forwarding capability under overwhelmed work-
load for both systems. To evaluate the performance, I set the IPS and SDNIPS as the
proxy of two virtual end hosts to forward ordinary traffic packets. I use hacking tools
[1] to initiate the DoS attack toward the IPS target at different attacking rate as the
interference source. For demonstration purpose, I choose two major DoS attacks as
candidates, which are Ping of Death (PoD) and SYN flood Attack. And then, one
VM sends normal health packets to another VM via proxy at the rate of average daily
traffic rate, to measure the IPS health traffic forwarding capability under attack. In
traditional IPS solution, DoS packets are captured by the IPS detection engine, which
further matches the rules and takes drop action on the inspecting packets.
In SDNIPS solution, the OVS fulfills the same task as Iptables does but it handles
packets by a different and more efficient mechanism. After Snort detecting packets
matching any signature, controller is able to be aware of the current threats in real
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Figure 7.6: The Impact of Health Traffic.
time by parsing CSV log file and then pushes corresponding flow entries into the
flowtable. After flowtable is updated, the malicious traffic can be handled by using
OVS fast path approach in line-rate, which can dramatically increase the system
performance and avoid the overwhelming traffic to interrupt normal traffic forwarding.
In Fig. 7.6, SDNIPS under both type of attacks has almost 100% forwarding rate,
which means that all normal traffic can be properly forwarded even the SDNIPS is
under the significant stress. For Snort/Iptables IPS, it has decreased around 68%
and 38% success forwarding rate under PoD attack and SYN flood respectively after
the attacking increase to 150,000 packets per second. The reason why health traffic
has higher success forwarding rate of health traffic under IPS PoD attack is because
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the SYNFlood attack consumes more bandwidth and network resources compared to
IPS PoD attack.
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Figure 7.7: Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Rate.
In Fig. 7.7, I evaluate the alert generation capacity of both IPS and SDNIPS under
flood interference. This metrics also states how IPS can process the attacking packets
from security perspective. To evaluate this performance, I generate two different types
of attacks, which are DoS flooding attack acting as the stressful background traffic
and ICMP flood attack acting as an potential threat to be tested. This evaluation
mainly indicates whether IPS and SDNIPS can generate alert under high workload
stress. The figure shows the successful alert generation rate of ICMP attack under DoS
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attack interference. It suggests that alert generation of traditional IPS is impacted
by DoS interference and most resources of IPS system are used to handle DoS attack
therefore the performance of alert generation rate decreases as the ICMP attack speed
increases.
When the speed of the ICMP attack reaches to 15000 packets per second, IPS can
only generate 13.72% alerts of the ICMP attack. On the other hand, SDNIPS is able
to efficiently avoid interference from DoS flooding attack due to OVS capability, so it
can successfully alert all the threats that are sent at the speed of 15000 packets per
second. When the speed of the ICMP attack reaches to 30000 packets per second,
the performance of SDNIPS start decreasing, and when the speed of ICMP attack
increases to 300000 packets per second, Snort agent in SDNIPS is not able to capture
packets and launch alerts because the snort detection engine itself almost reached its
threshold.
Thus, the evaluation comparing between proposed SDNIPS and traditional IPS
validates the analysis mentioned in section 7.2, which is that the SDNIPS has better
network and security performance in cloud virtual networking environment.
Network Reconfiguration
After the SDNIPS and traditional IPS are comparatively evaluated, I evaluate the
performance of SDNIPS NR alone since traditional IPS does not have the NR capa-
bility. I mainly evaluate two NR actions mentioned above, Traffic Redirection (TR)
and QoS Adjustment (QA), in the aforementioned cloud environment.
Fig. 7.8 shows the performance of resources consumption in term of the CPU
utilization of Dom 0 for all discussed NRs. I am using packet generator [51] to
generate the packets captured by Snort and processed by flowtable in order to test
the resources utilization change in the cloud system. In each NR approach, TR is
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implemented by using destination IP & MAC rewriting; while TR with spoofing reply
is implemented by rewriting not only destination IP & MAC address but also source
IP & MAC of victims. Thus, the attacking traffic can be redirected to a security
appliance that is able to spoof the attacker by replying the packet with victims’ IP
& MAC address as source address. TR with spoofing feature consumes a little more
resources than the pure TR since OVS modifies more packet fields to enable the
spoofing feature.
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Figure 7.8: CPU Utilization Performance of Major NRs.
The default NR, i.e., drop packets, consumes less system resource because the
OVS does not modify the matching flow and just simply drop them (output to a
non-existing virtual port in POX controller implementation). In the QA scenario, it
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has the best performance among all NRs because the rate limiting action is performed
based on OVS native mechanism, which means excess packets will be discarded and
OVS does not have to inspect and match the packet with all kinds of fields.
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Figure 7.9: TR Traffic Handle Capacity.
Fig. 7.9 provides the performance on the capacity of OVS and secure appliance
VM, e.g., DPI checker. In this scenario, I use TR (port rewriting) to redirect all
the attacking traffic to a DPI checker VM (4 vCPUs, 2,048 MB memory, Ubuntu
12.04 server OS). When the attacking packet rate is increased from 1,000 packets per
second up to 400,000 packets per second, the OVS can handle all the traffic without
any packet loss, which validates that the packet process capacity of OVS is expected.
The receive packet means the percentile of OVS redirected traffic has been received
by the DPI checker’s VIF. When the packet rate reaches the 400,000 packets per
76
second (I assume that there is no more than 400,000 packets generated in a single
physical server per second), the OVS can still handle 100% of the packet and security
appliance can receive 60% of them due to its VIF capacity.
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Figure 7.10: Bandwidth Performance of QA.
Fig. 7.10 evaluates the TCP bandwidth performance of OVS-based QA under
different speed limit rate. I use either IP flood or TCP SYN flood as the background
attack traffic and try to evaluate the available bandwidth on the same network. Both
IP and TCP SYN flood attack send flood traffic at their maximum rate (about 300k
packets per second). I limit the source port on OVS thus the attacking traffic arriving
at OVS is limited before being processed. The default speed is 10Gbits/s without
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any rate limit in XenServer cloud environment. The range of the speed limit is from
1 Mbits/s to 10Gbits/s.
For IP flooding attack, when the attack packet rate raises up to 5 Mbits/s, the
available bandwidth is still almost full (around 8 Gbits/s in XenServer environment),
which means when I limit the attacking traffic below 5 Mbits/s, it does not impact the
network where the victim is. With the increase of the speed limit, more bandwidth
is occupied by the attack traffic and thus less bandwidth is available for the victim.
For the TCP SYN flood attack, when the speed limit reaches to 4 Mbits/s, the TCP
bandwidth starts degrading because TCP SYN flood needs to establish the TCP
connection and this will definitely impact the TCP bandwidth performance. When
the speed limit is above 5.5 Mbits/s, almost no available bandwidth is available for
the victim. This evaluation result provides a valuable reference for any system when
deploying the QA NR as a security solution.
7.5 Network Security as a Service (NSaaS)
7.5.1 NSaaS System Architecture
After the SDNIPS is proposed, implemented, and evaluated, next research focus
goes to how to convert this system into a service provisioning system so that each
cloud tenant can claim such security service to use. Fig. 7.11 illustrates the system ar-
chitecture of the proposed Network-Security-as-a-Service (NSaaS). It shows its frame-
work in a virtual networking environment including cloud tenants running within the
data centers programmable networks and edge cloud (i.e., customer resources such as
computers or mobile devices). This setup is to demonstrate a common programmable
networking environment where the IT infrastructure can be established based on pub-
lic and private clouds running within one or multiple data centers and edge clouds
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containing end users computer/devices. For this NSaaS, I focus on network security
and various network security appliances that can be componentized as security appli-
ances to provide Network-Security-as-a-Service (NSaaS). NSaaS is controlled by the
cloud security service model including several major components to deploy NSaaS. In
the following research description, I will focus the presentation on how to construct
NSaaS.
Cloud Orchestration API Open vSwitch (OVS)
Private/Public Cloud
(Data Center/Enterprise Resource) Edge Cloud
Security Appliances
Cloud Security Service Model 
(virtual resource orchestration, flow programming, etc.)
SDN Network 
Controller
Cloud Controller
Security 
Analyser IDS IPS DPI
Security Policy 
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Cloud 
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(NSaaS)
Data Center Networks
Figure 7.11: SDNIPS as a Service System Architecture
Network-Security-as-a-Service (NSaaS) is a security appliance allocation model
according to the security requirements in the cloud environment. Similar work has
been presented in the Internet environment [35], where the authors proposed a mech-
anism called FireCol that is a collaborative system detecting flooding DDoS attacks
on the Internet Service Provider (ISP) network. FireCol takes the hop-count as the
evaluation metric and deploys IPS in the ISP networks. In contrast, NSaaS is an
SDN-enabled data center environment manipulating both traditional cloud resources
and the mobile edge cloud, and thus the IPS resource management must take a com-
79
prehensive approach that can be easily incorporated into the cloud cost evaluation
framework. In general, the NSaaS is deployed based on the cloud system resource
management according to the utilization of vCPU, memory, virtual hard disk, net-
work bandwidth, etc.
As shown in Fig. 7.11, the NSaaS are able to access and control all of three do-
mains, which are datacenter programmable networks, private/public cloud resources,
and edge cloud. Edge cloud is consist of mobile devices that may be acting as either
service resource consumer and provider. It connects to the private/public cloud do-
main through layer-2 network virtualization technology, e.g., GRE tunnel, VXLAN,
VPN, etc. Both edge and central cloud are connected by and sitting on top of the
SDN programmable networks. SDN programmable networks can be in the form of ei-
ther physical OpenFlow swtich or virtual Open vSwitch, and can provide flexible and
scalable NFV. The NSaaS is also a hierarchical security provisioning service, which
means that IDPS in terms of virtual appliances can be deployed in different tenant.
7.5.2 NSaaS Elasticity Model
Another critical research issue of NSaaS is that how to efficiently deploy the NSaaS
service in terms of IDPS virtual appliance in the datacenter environment. In the
FireCol [35], the IPS is deployed right on the routers of the ISP network and the
major metric is based on the detection range (number of hop) of IPS. In contract,
the NSaaS is deployed based on a more elastic policy where system resource (vCPU,
memory, virtual harddisk, etc.) and network resource (amount of traffic) are all
considered.
In the data center environment, the resource is virtually isolated in forms of ten-
ants. Resources in each tenant may cross multiple cloud clusters (each is denoted by
Cl) and may include edge cloud devices. NSaaS allocates security appliances for each
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Figure 7.12: NSaaS Elastic Service Model for One Tenant.
tenant or for the entire data center virtual network. To simplify the demonstration of
the elastic NSaaS elastic service model, I choose the IPS appliance as the example and
define the following notations that will be used in Fig. 7.12: the jth IPS in tenant i is
represented as IPSij, where each IPS has its own monitor and control range that does
not overlap with others. In this illustrative example, I define four elastic strategies
for IPS service deployments that are summarized in Table 7.3. Scale Up/Down is to
change the cloud resource configuration, and scale in/out is to change the number of
resources in terms of virtual machines.
The IPS with both VM configuration and network configuration are considered.
The VM configuration includes the number of vCPUs, virtual memory and the virtual
hard disk, while the network configuration includes different QoS requirements. For
example, an IPS hosting a VM can have x vCPU, where x = 1, 2, ...n. The number
of allocated vCPU is decided according to the security performance need. All con-
figurations are pre-defined by the system administrator in to a pool. For instance of
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Table 7.3: NSaaS Elastic Operations.
Title Actions
Scale-Up Increase the resources config
Scale-Down Decrease the resource config
Scale-Out Create a new IPS virtual appliance
Scale-In Shutdown a existing IPS virtual appliance
Migration Migrate tenant resource to optimized cluster
vCPU, the pool is pre-defined as follows: {1, 2, 3}, which means the number vCPU
can be configured as 1, 2, or 3. In the example setting, 1 denotes the bottom flavor
of vCPU and 3 denotes the top flavor. Scale up means increase flavor and scale down
means decrease the flavor.
There are two thresholds can be established, say overutilized and underutilized,
to decide adding or removing vCPUs. In general, the overutilized status triggers
the scale-up and the underutilized status triggers the scale-down action. Moreover,
there are two special cases: when an IPS hosting a VM only has one vCPU (bottom
flavor) and it is in the underutilized status, the system can enforce the scale-in policy;
and when an IPS hosting VM has n vCPU (which is the top flavor) and it is in
the overutilized status, it can scale-out. Particularly, the scale-in action has four
sub-actions: (1) evaluate the expected networking resources needed by the tenant
monitored by the current IPS; (2) check if any other IPS is available in the same
tenant with sufficient resources; (3) migrate the VMs from the current tenant into
the monitor range of available IPS from step 2; (4) shutdown the current IPS. Scale-
out is the reverse action of scale-in but with simpler sub-actions: (1) evaluate the
expected resources needed by the tenant under the current IPS; (2) create a new IPS
with proper number of vCPUs; (3) migrate the VMs from the current tenant to the
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monitor range of a newly created IPS. The example of the scaling function can be
illustrated in Fig. 7.13.
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Figure 7.13: NsaaS Elasticity Example
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Chapter 8
CLOUDARMOUR: CONSTRUCTING A SDN-BASED DEFENSIVE SYSTEM IN
THE VIRTUAL NETWORKING ENVIRONMENT
Motivated by the aforementioned research challenges, I am aiming to propose
a detection&prevention system with complete lifecycle to defend the harmful and
complicated attacks in the distributed cloud environment. The complete lifecycle can
be divided into three stages as shown in Fig. 8.1: Traffic Sniff, Attack Analysis and
Actions Execution. In the traffic sniff stage, attacker are detected by using IDS or
other monitoring agents. In the analysis stage, it should analyze the attack behavior
that helps further determine the malicious traffic. Finally, prevention actions should
be optimally executed to kill the malicious traffic without impacting other normal
traffic.
In this research, I propose “CloudArmour”, a new SDN-based cloud network se-
curity framework, providing attack traffic monitoring and detection, attack analysis,
and mitigation deployment. Compared to existing solutions, CloudArmour provides
the following unique features:
• I design a Traffic Statistics Aggregate Module (TSAM) to monitor network
traffic patterns and detect anomaly behaviors. Moreover, TSAM can also in-
Attack
Analysis
Action 
Execution
Traffic 
Monitor
Detection Mitigation
Figure 8.1: CloudArmour Lifecycle
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spect real packets to perform signature-based attacks detection. TSAM’s im-
plementation is efficient in that it is implemented based on OpenFlow protocol;
moreover, TSAM’s implementation is based on component-based design that
provides common interfaces (e.g., data access and operational functions) to fa-
cilitate other CloudArmour modules. For examples, TSAM provides interfaces
to support various existing detection modules such as anomaly and signature
based detection modules.
• I develop an Attack Source Tracer Module (ASTM) to track attack sources
at the SDN physical layer that prevents attackers from spoofing attack source
addresses even using dynamic address assigning approaches, e.g., no fixed IP is
assigned to a host such as using DHCP-based IP address assignments. ASTM
provides strong security protection against stealthy attack sources. This is
because attackers need to compromise the hypervisor of the cloud system in
order to fake their addresses.
• I devise a Mitigation Executor Module (MEM) to systematically implement var-
ious network reconfiguration approaches such as packets filtering, traffic redirec-
tion, traffic shaping (i.e., QoS-based adjustment), etc. I provide a comprehen-
sive performance evaluation to address the pros and cons of various mitigation
approaches.
• I implement 20 Python-based APIs for OpenFlow Controllers to interface traffic
monitoring, attack detection, traffic control and analysis modules. I illustrate
how to use the presented CloudArmour APIs by providing a comprehensive
tutorial on constructing a DDoS defense system in a cloud environment.
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Figure 8.2: CloudArmour System Overall Architecture.
8.1 CloudArmour Overall Design
The proposed CloudArmour system architecture is described in Fig. 8.2. All
SDN-enabled data plane elements including OpenFlow switch, Open vSwitch, and
other additional virutal&physical devices are connected and controlled by a central-
ized CloudArmour controller that is implemented based on POX controller [57]. Once
the centralized controller is connected with data plane elements, it has a cloud sys-
tem view including network topology, network connectivity status, packets statistics
information, etc. The proposed Traffic Statistics Aggregation Module (TSAM) is de-
signed on top of the SDN controller. It provides several traffic related interfaces (e.g.,
data access and operational functions). For example, TSAM APIs can be called to
expand flow table rules to collect more detailed traffic information such as IP/Mac
address, port number, etc.
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Figure 8.3: Traffic Statistic Aggregation Module
Above the TSAM, there are three highly integrated application modules: De-
tection&Monitor Module, Attack Source Tracer Module , and Mitigation Executor
Module. The Detection&Monitor Module is able to read the traffic statistics informa-
tion or fetch the real packets from all connected OpenFlow devices. It can also set up
the connection between OpenFlow devices and existing security application such as
intrusion detection engine. Furthermore, the Attack Source Tracer Module (ASTM)
traces back from the victim to identify the location of attack sources. Finally, the
Mitigation Executor Module (MEM) performs various network reconfiguration ap-
proaches such as traffic redirection, drop, QoS adjustment, etc.
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8.1.1 Security Application Interface Architecture
There are total 20 module APIs designed in the CloudArmour system. The
CloudArmour system provides API functions at different layers. The TSAM mod-
ule provides several API function calls to retrieve the traffic statistics information
in different format. On top of the TSAM, several highly integrated functions are
constructed to provide integrated services including attack source trace, mitigation
execution, etc. Users have sufficient flexibility to construct their security solution by
organizing several integrated modules together or develop their own service module
such as the detection engine based on our lower level module, e.g., traffic packet ac-
quisition module that will be discussed in section 8.2. Section 8.4 will give a concrete
example on how to construct a full life cycle security solution to defend the DDoS
attack based on the CloudArmour. All APIs are listed in section 8.5.
8.2 Traffic Statistics Aggregation Module (TSAM)
TSAM is designed to collect traffic statistics information and provide flexible data
access and operational functions. It is able to retrieve traffic statistics information
and packet content in a more efficient and flexible fashion because OpenFlow can
records all traffic flow information and corresponding statistics information in the
flow table of all its controlled devices.
8.2.1 Traffic Statistics Aggregation Architecture
As part of the infrastructure of the CloudArmour, the TSAM shown in Fig. 8.3
can be divided into several components, which are Flow Table Information Proxy,
Traffic Operator, Traffic Information Databases (DB)/Dataset(DS), Traffic Packet
Acquisition.
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The Flow Table Information Proxy retrieves flow table information periodically
and it can also configure flow table entries onto OpenFlow switches. The Traffic Op-
erator includes three modules, which are traffic matcher, traffic expander, and traffic
trimmer. These traffic operator modules get inputs from flow table information proxy
and output to several databases(DB) and datasets(DS). Data access and operational
function APIs supports flexible traffic statistics information retrieval. Existing Open-
Flow implementation does not support packet content inspection. To address this
issue, Traffic Packet Acquisition extends the limited flow level information to packet
content level that can be used for deep packet investigation. The developed TSAM
APIs can be found in Table. 8.1 in section 8.5.
Normally, network related security applications or modules need to retrieve the
traffic data information for further analysis. There are many ways to retrieve the
traffic data, for example, configuring the SPAN to forward the traffic to certain ap-
pliances, retrieving the traffic data based on some monitoring protocols, e.g., sFlow,
NetFlow, etc. There are pros and cons for all aforementioned solutions. Therefore,
by utilizing this characteristic, Traffic Statistics Aggregation Module (TSAM) is able
to retrieve traffic statistics information and then further provide the traffic data and
packet acquisition services to the upper layer security applications, which is shown in
Fig. 8.3. As part of the infrastructure of the CloudArmour system,
8.2.2 Flow Table Information Proxy
In order to collect the flow statistical information, the flow table information
proxy module maintains the connections with all OpenFlow devices. It periodically
checks the OpenFlow connections and grabs the traffic statistics information from all
connected OpenFlow switches. All the information collected by flow table information
proxy will be processed by the traffic operator. It also performs control function by
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injecting flow table rules into any specified OpenFlow switch. Basically, it acts as a
proxy between OpenFlow devices and CloudArmour modules by implementing read
and write functions.
8.2.3 Traffic Operator
To provide customized flow statistic data for CloudArmour APIs that can be
called by seccurity analysis modules, e.g., anomaly intrustion detection module, the
traffic operator is designed including three modules: traffic matcher, traffic trimmer,
and traffic expander. Their traffic operational functions are described as below:
Traffic Matcher is a module that implements matching function. Due to the
native feature of OpenFlow protocol, packets or flows can be matched through any
single field or combinations. Many APIs are implemented by utilizing the matcher
function.
Traffic Trimmer is the module trimming raw statistics data into a desired or
customized format. This module works with other modules such as traffic matcher
and traffic expander to generate the following statistics DB/DS, i.e., Traffic Volume
DS, Traceback DB, History Traffic DB. Users can also use these modules to build their
own customized data set, i.e., Customized DS, to fulfill their own design purposes.
Traffic Expander enables users to deeply investigate flow detail information. It
is possible that the flow table forwards packets based on very simple flow information,
which means that the flow statistics information may include insufficient information.
To investigate the traffic behaviors, more detailed traffic information are expected.
At this point, I implement the traffic expander function to expand the simple flow
entry into more detailed ones.
By default, the OpenFlow switch in datacenter can forward packets based on
layer-2 or layer-3 headers. Thus, the statistics information only maintains layer 2 or
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3 header information rather than upper layer information that is important metric
for determining attack signatures and behaviors. Once the traffic expander function
is triggered, the matched flow entry will be expanded with more detailed header
information specified by users. After detailed flow entries are injected into flow tables,
the traffic information proxy is able to collect more detailed statistics information of
the targeted traffic.
An example is introduced in the Fig. 8.4. The packets coming from node A are
forwarded to node B only based on IP addresses and corresponding flow entry is in the
format of {A-B, forward}. However, this information is insufficient for identifying the
malicious traffic type, e.g. HTTP traffic (TCP, 80). The traffic expander module is
able to dynamically update detailed rules by learning the expected header information
from packets. The developers can use traffic expander modules API to specify the
flow table fields that need to be expanded, such as IP protocol. So the corresponding
expanding rules, {A-B, TCP, forward} and {A-B, UDP, forward}, will be injected
to flow table. When more detail information is expected, such as destination port,
flow table entry {A-B, UDP, 53, forward}, {A-B, UDP, 2049, forward},{A-B, TCP,
22, forward} and {A-B, TCP, 80, forward} are inserted to the flow table. The port
numbers in the updating flow entries are automatically learned from the corresponding
headers of packets. We can increase the priority of the flow entry each time it is
expanded. Thus, due to the different priority, the TCP traffic with port 80 from A to
B only matches the highest priority rule, which is {A-B, TCP, 80, forward}. In this
way, it will not create duplicate counters on other higher level matching flow table
entries, i.e., it can be guaranteed that only the leaf node rules are matched.
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Figure 8.4: Tree-based Traffic Expanding Model.
8.2.4 Traffic Statistics Database/Dataset(DB/DS)
To maintain the history traffic information and realtime traffic information, I de-
sign DB and DS, respectively. In particular, two DSes and two DBs are implemented
to store real time traffic information and history traffic information. Using these DBs
and DSes, developers can acquire more customized traffic information based on the
functions provided by traffic operator.
Customized DS is an empty dataset for user to develop their own realtime
dataset based on their requirements. Traffic operator provides several basic meth-
ods for developers to transfer the OpenFlow statistics information to their own data
structure and sequence. Those basic methods could be found in Table. 8.1 in Ap-
pendix. Developers can customize user-defined realtime data set to support their
security application development.
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For example, authors in [67] present a method to proactively detect the DDoS
attack by using source IP address monitoring. To plug-in this detection method,
an IP address monitoring data set is required. Users could use get active switch()
function to find all the connected OVS and use get raw data (dpid, start time stamp,
end time stamp) to query the history traffic information. IP Address Database can be
generated from these history knowledge. Then, based on the detection method men-
tioned in this work, it can apply the customized monitor (match, start time stamp,
time period, recurring = true) function to watch all the real time traffic information.
I set the ∆n(n = 1, 2, 3, ...) as the detection resolution parameter in the function,
then collect IP address information during each time slot ∆n and formulate a real
time system IP address dataset. This dataset supports upper layer detection engines
and algorithms to analyze the system status and report the potential DDoS attacks.
Traffic Volume DS can be used for supporting traffic volume-based detection
engines or monitors to identify the anomaly behaviors in the system. Most volume-
based detection engines need the traffic volume sequence to monitor the system status
and detect the anomaly traffic behaviors. To fulfill this requirement, the flow table
information proxy will request each OVS to return their current ingress traffic vol-
ume of each port attached by active VM every ∆T time period. Then the Traffic
Information Trimmer will trim the raw data as follows formation: {Destination IP,
Source VM IP sets, Traffic Volume, Time Stamp}.
For each active VM i in the system, let Ri(t) be the summation of traffic volume
record from all the source IP addresses to the destination VM i at timestamp t,
where t is the discrete time index. So at timestamp t, the system overall ingress
traffic volume record V (t) could be calculated by V (t) =
∑k
i=1Ri(t), k is the total
number of current active VMs in the system. After having the system traffic volume
record at each timestamp t, to generate the system traffic volume data sequence
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{St, t = 0, 1, ..., n}, we have S(t) = V (t+ ∆t)− V (t). The request time period ∆t is
selected by corresponding detection engine and detection resolution.
Traceback DB is used to help Attack Source Tracer (AST) to traceback mali-
cious insiders in the system. In traditional cloud computing system, when attack is
performed by malicious insider with spoofed source IP addresses or MAC addresses,
it is difficult to trace them since there is no an effective mechanism to bining IP
addresses and connected physical port. Using CloudArmour, the decoupled data and
control plane enable us to track the attacking source by looking up the traffic ingress
port and egress port of OVS flow table, which can be tampered only if the attack-
ers can compromise the underlying virtualization layer, e.g., the hypervisor, which is
considered safe in this work.
At the back end of AST, the traceback database provides the Source VM and
Destination VM pair for each flow, which means even the source IP address of traffic
packet is spoofed, the system still can traceback the source virtual machine by looking
up this database. To generate the source and destination pair for a flow, traffic
information proxy acquires the statistics data from flow table of each OVS and traffic
operator will trim the data into following structure: {OVS ID, Ingress Port, Interface
type, Destination IP, Egress port,}. This information is stored in each OVS and its
flow table. OVS ID indicates which OVS this flow belongs to. Ingress Port and
Egress Port represent which port a flow comes through and to which port this flow is
delivered. Interface Type shows the type of the ingress port of this flow, which could
be Controller, OVS or Virtual Machine. This table tells us the abstract topology
of current network connection and the true location of each OVS with its attached
active VMs. It also shows where each traffic flow is exactly delivered. The system
can have an accurate information of source & destination pairs from this database
and the AST will trace the malicious insider based on it.
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Traffic History DB can be used for upper layer security modules to develop
machine learning-based or data mining-based detection and monitor applications.
This database logs all the history traffic information for developers to perform deep
investigation of traffic patterns and features. Some functions provided in Table. 8.1
in Appendix can be called to retrieve the historical information easily. The flow
table information proxy requests all the active switches to return their flow table
statistics information with a configurable time interval and store them in following
structure: Switch DPID, Request Time, Raw Data Statistics. get raw data(dpid,
start time stamp, end time stamp) could retrieve the historical raw traffic data based
on switch dpid and timestamp. It will return the parsed raw data information by a
python dictionary with dpid and time sequence as the retrieving key.
8.2.5 Traffic Packet Acquisition
Besides collecting and operating on the traffic statistics information, some security
applications such as detection engine or DPI need to be deployed to inspect packet
content. Thus, I introduce a modular called Traffic Packet Acquisition (TPA) to poll
the real packets instead of traffic statistics information to the controller that further
forward to the security applications. Users are able to specify what traffic need to be
polled to the controller for inspection. The aforementioned module, traffic matcher,
enables developers or users specify what packets they are looking for. After users and
developers determine the packets they are interested in, new flow table rules will be
injected into connected OpenFlow devices so that following matching packets will be
forward to the traffic packet acquisition module.
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8.3 CloudArmour Service Module Design and Implementation
This section discusses the integrated service modules that are constructed based
on the TSAM. All the Python-based APIs of service module can be found in Table.
8.2 in section 8.5.
8.3.1 Traffic Monitor and Detection
In a comprehensive security solution including detection, analyzer and mitigation,
traffic monitor and detection is usually the first step. The intrusion detection sys-
tem can be divided into two types, signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature
detection searches network traffic for a series of bytes or packet sequences known
to be malicious. For example, users might use a signature that looks for particular
strings within an exploit payload to detect attacks that are attempting to exploit a
particular buffer-overflow vulnerability. The anomaly detection technique centers on
the concept of a baseline for network behavior. The anomaly detection can perform
the detection based on different aspect, such as IP address changes, destination port
changes, volume changes, protocol anomalies, etc. In this traffic monitor and detec-
tion module, there are two types of information query approaches: packet-based and
statistics-based. An example of how to utilize the monitor and detection module API
will be given in section 8.4.
8.3.2 Attack Source Tracer Module (ASTM)
The attack behaviors need to be further analyzed after it is detected. One of the
most important tasks is to determine the location of the attack sources. A common
way to identify the location of attack sources is to use the trace back techniques that
is based on several metrics such as IP address, MAC address. Traditional solutions,
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such as packet marking technique [87, 73] for IP traceback, always need to modify
the packets, which causes overhead. However, it is impossible to correctly trace back
all the attack sources based on IP or MAC addresses, when the attacks perform with
source address spoofing techniques. Based on the unique feature of OpenFlow that
flow table history records the historical flow information, users can utilize the ingress
and egress port characteristic to perform the trace back function. Since the ingress
and egress ports are the native property of the OpenFlow devices, thus they can not
ba spoofed if it is assumed that the OpenFlow itself is not compromised. Thus, any
IP or MAC spoofing technique does not work when performing trace back functions
at the port level.
Thus, I propose an IP spoofing prevented attack source trace back mechanism
called Attack Source Tracer Module (ASTM). I will discuss an example to illustrate
how the ASTM works in the OVS scenario (this algorithm can be also simply applied
to physical OpenFlow switch scenario). The benefit of considering the OVS port
over the traditional network switch port is that it is possible to know if a dedicated
OVS port is connecting to a VM directly or another OVS’s tunnel port. As shown
in Fig. 2.1, each flow entry has a field called in port. Through this information,
the CloudArmour is able to trace back attacker VMs from the OVS that any victim
directly connects. The connectivity of all OVS can be modeled as a graph. I first
define a function called traceback as below:
trace cur OVS(cur OVS, dst IP, IP prototol, port number) = {OVS/VM}
The trace cur OVS function returns all entities (VM or OVS) that sending pack-
ets to the current OVS (cur OVS) with destination IP = dst IP, IP protocol =
IP prototol, port number = port number. Thus I propose a trace back algorithm
based on depth-first search, which is described in Algorithm 1. The input of this al-
gorithm is the IP address of the victim, attack traffic type, e.g., TCP port 80 traffic,
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and the OVS that the victim is directly connecting to. The algorithm returns a list of
all attacker VMs (OVS ports that all attack VMs are attached). The Python-based
API of this attack source traceback algorithm can be also found in Table. 8.2.
Algorithm 1 Attack Source Traceback Algorithm
Input: IP proto, port number VMvictim, OV Svictim
Output: {Set of Attacker VMs}
1: v ← OV Svictim
2: TraceRecursion (OVS v, Set AttackVM)
3: if v = VM then
4: ZVM.add(v)
5: return
6: end if
7: for each x ∈ trace cur OV S(cur OV S, dst IP, IP proto, port number) do
8: if x.visited = FALSE then
9: TraceRecursion(x, list)
10: end if
11: end for
12: RETURN list
8.3.3 Mitigation Executor Module(MEM)
The Mitigation Executor Module(MEM) is proposed to provide the mitigation
actions for users. In the SDN-based mitigation, when controller insert a mitigation
flow rule to the OpenFlow device, no matched overwhelming malicious traffic will be
sent to the controller, and the drop action is executed either in the kernel level of the
OVS or the hardware level of the physical OpenFlow switch. This mechanism can
guarantee the performance of mitigation as well as the detection engine. Thus, the
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mitigation capability of SDN-based one can be expected more efficient than traditional
mitigation approach, e.g., Iptables NFQueue. The representative mitigation actions
are the same as what I discussed in section 7.3. The performance between SDN-based
mitigation and traditional mitigation approach is already evaluated in section 7.4.2.
8.4 Tutorial, Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, I provide a use case to present how cloud security solution re-
searcher and developer can leverage the benefits of CloudArmour to construct flexible
and efficient network security applications. I construct and implement a DDoS defen-
sive system based on CloudArmour framework. At last, I evaluate the CloudArmour
in the DDoS scenario. All the modules are implemented in the mininet [55] envi-
ronment and the evaluation is conducted in the real Xen-based virtual networking
environment.
8.4.1 A Tutorial: A DDoS Defensive Solution
DDoS Attack Model
According to the definition from WWW Security FAQ [75] on Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks: “A DDoS attack uses many computers to launch a coordi-
nated DoS attack against one or more targets. Using client/server technology, the
perpetrator is able to multiply the effectiveness of the DoS significantly by harness-
ing the resources of multiple unwitting accomplice computers, which serve as attack
platform”. The DDoS is distinguished from other attacks by its ability to deploy its
weapons in a “distributed” way over the network and to aggregate these forces to
create lethal traffic. DDoS can be simply divided into two categories, the bandwidth
depletion attack and the resource depletion attack. The bandwidth depletion attack
is designed to flood the victim’s network with overwhelming traffic that prevents legit-
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Figure 8.5: DDoS Attack Model
imate traffic from reaching the victim, while the resource depletion attack is trying to
break the victim’s system by either breaking the protocol running on victim’s system
or crashing the victim’s system by sending incorrect data packets.
The attack scenario is modeled in Fig. 8.5. The DDoS attack is the most advanced
form of DoS attacks, which has been regarded as the most noticeable threat to Internet
security by both Kaspersky Labs and Symantec. A representative IDS/IPS system
Snort [5] claims that the detection and prevention for DDoS is not as effective as for
other attacks. The DDoS is distinguished from other attacks by its ability to deploy
its weapons in a “distributed” way over the network and to aggregate these forces to
create lethal traffic. DDoS can be simply divided into two categories, the bandwidth
depletion attack and the resource depletion attack. The bandwidth depletion attack
is designed to flood the victim’s network with overwhelming traffic that prevents
legitimate traffic from reaching the victim, while the resource depletion attack is
trying to break the victim’s system by either breaking the protocol running on victim’s
system or crashing the victim’s system by sending incorrect data packets. Although
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DDoS has different types of attack in terms of the way of performing attack, they still
have common in nature, which is that a great number of packets from multiple zombie
hosts go to the victim at the same time. This work is also based on the assumption
that all DDoS traffic initiated from multiple zombies belongs to the same type.
Module Composition Flow
To construct the DDoS defensive solution based on CloudArmour modules, I first
divide the defensive solution into four phases: DDoS behavior detection, attack anal-
ysis, zombie trace, and mitigation execution. These four modules are executed in an
assembly line fashion. The processing phases of the DDoS defensive solution based
on CloudArmour are illustrated in Fig. 8.6.
The object of DDoS detection engine is to detect the DDoS attack behavior.
The detection engine can be implemented as either a signature-based approach or
an anomaly-based one. The anomaly-based detection engine can be simply con-
structed by calling monitor volume(match, start time, time period,recurring). Users
can also plug-in an existing signature-based detection engine such as Snort, by calling
ids connector(match,detection engine ip) function to make traffic flows and detection
engine connected. After the DDoS behavior is detected, further inspection needs to be
performed to determine: (1) identifying the victim; (2) identifying the type of DDoS
traffic initiated from zombies. Flow table expander(in port, out port, ethernet layer,
ip layer, transport layer) can be used to generate more elaborated traffic statistics
information, which can be further analyzed to determined aforementioned informa-
tion. When DDoS behavior, DDoS traffic type, and victim are all confirmed by the
previous modules, attack source traceback (victim ip, victim ovs, attack traffic type)
function is triggered to identify all DDoS traffic sources in zombie trace phase. After
zombie machines are all identified by traceback function, mitigation will be performed
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Figure 8.6: DDoS Defensive Solution Construction Flow
to stop the DDoS attacking traffic at all port entries of the OpenFlow devices.
8.4.2 Implementation and Evaluation
I build a comprehensive DDoS defensive system based on our CloudArmour frame-
work and three major components, DDoS Detection Engine, DDoS Traffic Analyzer,
Zombie Tracer and Mitigation Executor are implemented by CloudArmour APIs. Im-
plementation is demonstrated by screenshots and evaluation validates the feasibility
and flexibility of the CloudArmour framework.
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Volume-based Anomaly Detection Engine
A lightweight DDoS detection engine is designed to detect the anomaly overwhelming
traffic in time. This detection engine choose to apply the non-parametric Cumulative
Sum (CUSUM) [24] algorithm to detect the occurrence of abrupt change of the system
overall traffic volume. To simplify the detection engine and reduce the overhead, this
method only focuses on the system traffic volume and alerts the potential DDoS
attack activities. Similar methods could be found in [81, 67], where [81] watches the
occurrence of large difference between the number of SYNs and FINs and [67] detects
the anomaly increase of new source IP addresses ratio.
I use TSAM API to setup a monitor to watch the system overall traffic volume
and formulate a traffic volume data set X(t) = {x1, x2, .., xn}, where xn is the whole
system ingress traffic volume in the nth time interval. To make the method more
general, I use the Exponential Moving Average (EMA) method to normalize the
traffic volume data set. Thus, given the normalized data set X(t), non-parametric
CUSUM could be simplified by following equation based on [24]:
yt = (yt−1 +X(t))+, y0 = 0, (8.1)
To determine a potential flooded attack to VM i, the decision function can be pre-
sented as follows:
dN(yt) =

0 if yt ≤ N,
1 if yt > N.
(8.2)
N is the flood threshold and yt > N indicates the occurrence of flood traffic in the
system at time stamp t. This threshold can be calculated based on the degree of
detection sensitive, which was explained in [24] and will not be elaborated here.
Seagull[39] is used to generate background traffic at a normal speed and Pktgen[51]
is used to emulate DDoS traffic due to its ability of generating packets at extremely
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Figure 8.7: DDoS Detection Engine Implementation Screenshot
high speed in the kernel. Implementation scenario can be found in Fig. 8.8. 9 zombie
machines perform DDoS attack by flooding traffic packets to the same victim at the
same time.
Fig. 8.7 is the screenshot of our implemented anomaly-based detection module.
I choose the detection resolution ∆T equals 60 seconds so that the DDoS detection
engine queries the traffic volume, average traffic volume, and CUSUM statistics score
every 60 seconds. When the CUSUM statistics score exceeds the threshold, Traffic
Analyzer and Mitigation Executor will be trigged to protect the system.
IP Spoofing Attack Traceback
Attack Source Traceback module can track all the packets even they are intentionally
modified to spoof security agent and other virtual machines in the cloud environment.
Based on different traceback type, it can target the attackers who are sending mali-
cious packets with specific attacking signature, for example, the Ping of Death attack
is performed by changing the IP fragments information of packets headers and try
to overflow receiver’s memory buffer. It also can trace the distributed attackers, e.g.
zombie machines in DDoS attack, which they always send huge amount of attacking
traffic to victim at the same time and forge the security agent with spoofed IP ad-
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1 10.0.1.4 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.5 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
2 10.0.1.6 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
3 10.0.1.7 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
4 10.0.1.8 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
5 10.0.1.9 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
5 10.0.1.10 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
In_port Src_IP Dst_IP Src_port Dst_port Action
1 10.0.1.2 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.3 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.4 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.5 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.6 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.7 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.8 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.9 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
1 10.0.1.10 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
2 10.0.2.9 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
3 10.0.2.10 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
4 10.0.2.11 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
5 10.0.2.12 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
5 10.0.2.13 10.0.2.6 60700 80 Output:6
Figure 8.8: DDoS Attack Scenario and flow table Entries
dresses. In this scenario, I develop a zombie trace application based on CloudArmour
APIs to test the feasibility of our back end framework. I implement this component
fitting in the scenario described in Fig 8.8.
In Fig. 8.8, it can be seen that all the VMs in the system are connected to the
OVS bridge through virtual interface (VIF) and each network interface has attached
to one switch port. It can be found that the number of source IP addresses is more
than current active VMs, which means the IP spoofing attack is performed. This is
based on the assumption that each port can be only connected with one VIF with a
single IP address. Attack zombie host 1 inserts 4 flow entries in the flow table and it
is sending 4 kinds of traffic to victim VM with forged source IP addresses. Zombie
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Figure 8.9: Screenshot of ASTM in DDoS Attack Scenario
machine 5 and 9 also apply IP Spoofing technique to challenge the traceback of zombie
machines. In this situation, it can not track the zombie machines based on IP address
because they are spoofed and changed intentionally. However, due to the assumption
that OpenFlow port can not be forged, from the flow table of OVS 1, it can be seen
that the source IP address {10.0.1.2, 10.0.1.3, 10.0.1.4, 10.0.1.5} come from the same
ingress port and this ingress port is connected to only one active VM. So when users
traceback the zombie machines, users only call the function attack source traceback
(victim ip,victim ovs,ip proto, port number) in CloudArmour. I set the victim ip as
10.0.2.6 and the detected ip proto as ICMP (I leave the
port number field blank because ICMP does not have port number), and then set the
victim ovs as the dpid of the OVS that victim attaches. This function returns all the
ports of zombie machines.
Fig. 8.9 is the screenshot of the ASTM. it can be seen that the victim IP address
is 10.0.2.6 and attack traffic type is ICMP. It also reports the number of current
active IP addresses, i.e., 23, and the number of active OVS ports, i.e., 5, and then it
tracebacks all the ports of suspect zombie machines in each OVS. From the scrrenshot,
ports 1,2,3,4,5 on OVS1 and ports 2,3,4,5 on OVS2 are determined as the ports that
the zombie machines are connected.
106
CloudAmoure Mitigation Executor
In this section, I evaluate the performance of OVS-based mitigation compared to
the traditional IPS mitigation that is implemented based on the Iptable and Snort. I
setup our test environment based on Fig.8.8. OpenFlow-based solution and IPS-based
solution are deployed separately in two different experiment. Zombie machines are
located at different servers and it can be assumed that the DDoS behavior has been
detected previously. In the OpenFlow-based mitigation, Open vSwitch is planted in
each physical servers and corresponding prevention rules are inserted to the flow table
to tackle the DDoS malicious traffic and protect the normal traffic delivery. In the
IPS solution, an IPS device, e.g. Snort agent is installed in each physical server and it
is configured to drop malicious overwhelming traffic. Among all mitigation options,
I choose drop action as the countermeasure approach to conduct the comparison
evaluation. In this scenario, all the zombie machines are performing DDoS flooding
attack and sending normal traffic at the same time. I evaluate the success rate of
processing normal traffic to measure the mitigation capability of different approach
when they are both under significant stress.
The evaluation result is shown in Fig. 8.10. All the packets are 100% processed
by Open vSwitch even the attack rate reaches to 350,000 packets per second. This
is because Open vSwitch can block all the already known malicious packets before
they are forwarded. However, traditional IPS mitigation can not fully prevent the
interruption of flooding traffic due to the mechanism of Iptables and Snort, traffic
packets are always congested into Iptables Queue. The capability of Snort is not
enough to handle all the traffic when the attack rate higher than 17,550 packets per
seconds. In OpenFlow case, the detection kernel is decoupled from mitigation module,
the mitigation is performed in the data plane of the OVS in line-rate, which guarantees
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Figure 8.10: Comparison Evaluation between OpenFlow-based and Traditional Mit-
igation
the packet processing still can work properly even system is under overwhelming
flooding attack.
Fig. 8.11 shows the performance of various mitigation options in terms of the
CPU utilization. Packet generator [51] is used to generate the packets mitigated by
MEM. In all mitigation approaches, TR is implemented by using destination IP &
MAC rewriting; while TR with spoofing reply is implemented by rewriting not only
destination IP & MAC address but also source IP & MAC of victims. Thus, the
attacking traffic can be redirected to a security appliance that is able to spoof the
attacker by replying the packet with victims’ IP & MAC address as source address.
108
1 1000 2500 5000 7500 10000 12500 15000 17500 20000 22500 25000 30000
Attack Rate(packets/second)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
C
P
U
 U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
(%
)
CPU Utilization Performance of Major NRs
Drop
TR
TR with Spoofing
QA
Figure 8.11: Major Mitigation Options Evaluation
TR with spoofing feature consumes a little more resources than the pure TR since
OVS modifies more packet fields to enable the spoofing feature. The default NR, i.e.,
drop packets, consumes less system resource because the OVS does not modify the
matching flow and just simply drop them (output to a non-existing virtual port in
POX controller implementation). In the QA scenario, it has the best performance
among all mitigations because the rate limiting action is performed based on OVS
native mechanism, which means excess packets will be discarded and OVS does not
have to inspect and match the packet with all kinds of fields. Since the mitigation is
same as the NR I discussed in section 7.3, thus the evaluation result of the mitigation
is also the same as the NR evaluation shown in Fig. 7.8.
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Overall Performance Evaluation
The performance of our implemented DDoS defensive solution is showed in Fig. 8.12.
X axis represent the time after starting the experiment and the Y axis represent
the CUSUM statistics value yt, which could be considered as the score of current
traffic. The blue line shows the curve of CUSUM statistics score during the test
and the red line shows the threshold which is computed based on the method in
[19]. From the results, it can be seen that the detection engine will not generate
alert for the normal traffic even there are some busty increasing and decreasing traffic
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Figure 8.12: Comprehensive DDoS Defensive Solution Performance Evaluation
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generated by Seagull. However, when performing DDoS attack at the 26th minutes,
our detection engine swiftly detects the anomaly ingress traffic volume and trigger
the ASTM and MEM for further investigation and mitigation. At the 28th minutes,
CUSUM statistics score goes down under the threshold, which the DDoS attack has
been successfully mitigated. Since the detection resolution is set to 60 seconds, 2
minutes processing time proves the feasibility and efficiency of the CloudArmour
framework on constructing comprehensive defensive solution in virtual networking
environment.
8.5 CloudArmour APIs
Table. 8.1 illustrates all Python-based APIs for TSAM modules. Table. 8.2 illus-
trates all Python-based APIs for service modules including detection engine, ASTM,
and MEM.
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Table 8.1: TSAM API Summarization
Function Parameters Explanation
get active switch return all active connections
get active port dpid return all active ports of specified OpenFlow switch
get port volume dpid, port, start time,
end time, ingress
get history port traffic volume from start time to
end time, time format shoud be python standard time
format, ingress value is true by default and set it to
false to watch the egress traffic volume of the port
monitor port volume dpid, port, start time,
time period, recurring, ingress
monitor port ingress or egress traffic volume from
start time every time period seconds the method mon-
itor ingress traffic by default, when ingress=false, it
will monitor the egress traffic volume
monitor volume match, start time,
time period, recurring
monitor traffic volume from start time every
time period time, user needs to set the attribute
of match to define the flow to be monitored and the
function will return real time data set
get volume match, start time, end time,
time period, ingress
return the history traffic volume information for the
matched flow from start time to end time, by default
ingress value is true and set it to false to monitor the
egress traffic volume
flow table expander in port, out port, ether-
net layer, ip layer, trans-
port layer
expand the raw flow table rules to detail flow rules
automatically, set the ethernet layer, ip layer, trans-
port layer parameter to false to disable the expand for
corresponding layer
get packet match,controller port send all matched packets to controller
traceback IP destination IP, traffic type this function return all the source ip addresses who are
sending specific traffic type to destination ip
customized monitor match, start time,
time period, recurring
set up a monitor, match flow and start time, return
the match flows information every time period
check customized counter match, start time, counter check if the number of matched packets exceed the
counter value
get raw data dpid, start time, end tim get raw traffic statistics information of selected switch
from start time to end time. It returns a python dic-
tionary with dpid and record time as the key
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Table 8.2: CloudArmour Application Module API Summarization
Function Parameters Explanation
ids connector match, detection engine ip get the matched packet from the OVS and forward it
to the third party detection engine
traffic volume monitor ovs, port, threshold set up a monitor to watch the system traffic volume,
when the traffic exceed the threshold, return a notifi-
cation
customized counter match, start time stamp,
counter
set up a counter for matched flow, when the number
of matched flows reach the threshold, it will return a
notification
attack source traceback victim ip, victim ovs, ip proto,
port number
return the list of port and the attached OVS at-
tack traffic type is needed to traceback the source at-
tackers from victim ovs
traffic drop match drop all the traffic based on the match fields
traffic redirect match, destination ip redirect all the matched traffic to new destination ip
traffic redirect spoof match, destination ip, spoof ip redirect all the matched traffic to new destination ip
and change the source ip to spoof ip
traffic qos dpid, port, qos rate, ingress,
egress
set the port of openvswitch ingress and egress traffic
rate ingress and egress traffic rate is limited by default,
set ingress or egress to false to disable the rate limit
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
9.1 MobiCloud: a Geo-distributed Mobile Cloud Computing Platform
The proposed MobiCloud system is able to provide resources in terms of comput-
ing, storage, and networking that greatly enhances the capability of mobile devices.
It combines network-based storage, Xen virtualization, and OpenFlow based network
management solutions into one smart system, and that has not been seen previously
to our best knowledge. Also, an example of system experience is given to better state
the capabilities of MobiCloud. Finally, the performance evaluation of the MobiCloud
shows expected results.
9.2 Constructing Virtual Networks in a Geo-Distributed Programmable Layer-2
Networking Environment (G-PLaNE)
After the MobiCloud system is design and implemented, I introduce a geo-distributed
cloud resource provisioning system called G-PLaNE that is discussed in terms of sys-
tem components, network architectures, and etc. Virtual network creation, as a major
service provided by G-PLaNE, is explained from two perspectives, intra-domain vir-
tual network and an inter-domain virtual network. A concrete example, SeRViTR,
is given to illustrate how virtual network construction can help in the current re-
search. G-PLaNE posts an efficient and flexible way to construct a virtual network
in a geo-distributed cloud environment to enable more research capabilities.
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9.3 Mobile Cloud User-Centric Model
After both MobiCloud and G-PLaNE are established, I investigate the service
model of such MCC system. I first explore the motivation of emerging MCC and
summarize three current MCC service models. Then, the transformation from tra-
ditional Internet cloud to mobile cloud is discussed by comprehensively defining the
MCC, which is not merely a combination of cloud computing and mobile computing.
Representative works are also summarized according to service models I classified. Fi-
nally, the future MCC design principle as well as a conceptual Human-centric MaaR
approach including service model and a easy to understand example are proposed.
9.4 SDNIPS: Enabling a SDN-Based Intrusion Prevention System in Clouds
I propose an SDN-based Intrusion Prevention System called SDNIPS in the cloud
virtual networking environment. It inherits the intrusion detection capability from
Snort and flexible network reconfiguration from SDN. SDNIPS is firstly compared
with traditional IPS from principle perspective and the real world evaluation. NR
actions are also designed and developed based on OVS and POX controller. The
evaluation such as NIDS performance, performance comparison between the proposed
SDNIPS and Iptables/Snort IPS, validates the superior of proposed solution. I also
evaluate the representative NR actions to prove its feasibility and efficiency. Finally,
NSaaS are proposed to enable the security application as a service with elasticity and
scalability considered.
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9.5 CloudArmour: Constructing a SDN-based Defensive System in the Virtual
Networking Environment
CloudArmour is a new SDN-based module composition framework to comprehen-
sively construct security defensive solutions in virtual networking environment. It
is to simply deliver the SDN-based security solution by providing efficient service
modules. The proposed TSAM enables users access the customized traffic statistics
information and real traffic sequence so that traffic monitor and detection capability
can be delivered. Several service modules are design and implemented to provide
detection, attack sources traceback, and mitigation services. A DDoS defensive sys-
tem is given as an example to illustrate how to construct the comprehensive security
solution based on the CloudArmour. The implementation and evaluation show the
feasibility and functionality of the proposed system.
9.6 Limitations and Future Works
The limitations and corresponding future works of the proposed research are listed
as follows:
• OAuth 2.0 Integration The OAuth 2.0 [62] authorization protocol enables
a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either
on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between
the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party ap-
plication to obtain access on its own behalf. It helps manage MobiCloud users
accessing both inside and outside services. Besides that, OAuth could work to-
gether with an existing Kerberos based ID management system, such as Active
Directory, which provides more flexible and scalable capability for MobiCloud
ID management.
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• Dynamic VM Migration. Based on a mobile users’ geographic location in
MobiCloud and G-PLaNE system, its VM can be migrated from its home cluster
to a guest cluster for better performance. The VM migrations are operated using
the inter-cluster networking system. In this way, VMs’ migrations are protected
during the migration procedure, in which the VMs will not be exposed to the
public domain.
• Detection Synchronization. Current SDNIPS does not provide the mul-
tiple detection engines synchronization capability, which means that multiple
detection engines are able to detect one attack behavior. Current IDS, even
multiple IDS distributed at different cluster, can not provide the collaborative
IDS capability.
• RESTful API. Current CloudArmour implementation is based on the POX
in python. All implemented APIs are python-based. To increase the avail-
ability of the proposed system, it is expected to provide the RESTful API so
that all languages supporting the normal HTTP method are compatible with
CloudArmour system.
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